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BANKRUPTCY LAW
The HonorableDouglas 0. Tice, Jr. *
Suzanne E. Wade **

K Elizabeth Sieg *
I. INTRODUCTION

This article is a survey of bankruptcy cases from courts in the
Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court of the United States since
Congress passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act ("BAPCPA") in 2005.1 Because bankruptcy law is
federal law, there are many cases outside of the Fourth Circuit that
are highly persuasive and instructive to courts within the Fourth
Circuit on bankruptcy and insolvency issues. Many bankruptcy
cases outside of the Fourth Circuit are widely reported in the
news-Chryslere and GM3 are the most notable at this time. This

*
Chief Judge, United States Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 1957, B.S., 1955, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
•* Boleman Law Firm, P.C., Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 1990, George Mason School of
Law; B.A., 1981, University of Richmond. The author would like to thank Betty Cabell Brogan, Jim Flaherty, Trenya Futrell, Stuart Salmon, and Greg Thomas.
*** Associate, McGuireWoods LLP, Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 2008, University of
Richmond School of Law; B.S., 2004, Georgia Tech. Former law clerk to the Honorable Kevin
R. Huennekens, United States Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond,
Virginia, 2008-2009.
1. For a discussion of the changes made to the Bankruptcy Code by BAPCPA, see

Richard C. Maxwell & B. Webb King, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Bankruptcy Law, 40
U. RICH. L. REV. 53 (2005).
2. See John Anastasi, Chrysler Files for Bankruptcy; Dealers Optimistic, BUCKS
COUNTY COURIER TIMES, May 1, 2009, at 1; Aleksanders Rozens, Chrysler Files for Bankruptcy, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS REP., May 4, 2009, at 20; Jim Rutenberg & Bill Vlasic,
Chrysler Files for Bankruptcy; U.A.W. and Fiat to Take Control, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2009,
at Al.
3. See Kristine Owram, GM Files for Bankruptcy Protection;Automaker Says No
Cuts to CanadianPlants Beyond Ones Already Announced, GUELPH MERCURY (Canada),
June 2, 2009, at A10; David Welch, GM Files for Bankruptcy, BUS. WK. ONLINE, June 2,

2009.
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article is restricted to a sampling of interesting Fourth Circuit and
Supreme Court cases about common issues in consumer and business bankruptcies so that practitioners in this region may use these
case summaries as a starting point for more focused research.
II. CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY CASES

A. FilingFees
In In re Davis, a Chapter 7 debtor filed a motion to proceed in
forma pauperis, seeking to waive the Chapter 7 filing fee under 28
U.S.C. § 1930(f).4 The debtor engaged the local legal aid office to assist in filing the bankruptcy case and tendered $299 to legal aid to
be held in escrow for the filing fee. 5 The debtor testified that the
$300 cash-in-hand listed on her Schedule B included the money
held in escrow by legal aid.6
Section 1930(f)(1) provides a two-prong test for waiving the filing
fee. The first prong is to determine if the debtor's income is less
than one hundred fifty percent of the poverty guidelines set forth by
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 7 If so, the
court then examines whether the debtor has the ability to pay the
filing fee in installments. 8 Before deciding Davis, in In re Lineberry
the court cited a case from the Bankruptcy Court for the Western
District of Missouri that examined three factors related to paying in
installments. 9 These factors were: (1) whether the debtor can pay
the fee from his income after reasonable expenses are considered, or
from his assets; (2) whether the debtor is able to pay the fee in installments; and (3) if there is a fee arrangement between the debtor
and his attorney.10 In Davis, the debtor satisfied the first prong of
the test.1' But when the court reviewed the three factors laid out in
Nuttall under the second prong, it found that the debtor's ability to
place $299 in escrow indicated she did have the ability to pay the

4. In re Davis, 372 B.R. 282, 284 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2007).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1930(f)(1) (2006).
8. Id.
9. 344 B.R. 487, 492 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2006) (citing In re Nuttall, 334 B.R. 921, 923-25

(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005)).
10.
11.

In re Nuttall, 334 B.R. at 923-25.
In re Davis, 372 B.R. at 285.
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filing fee. 12 The debtor argued that the escrowed funds were exempt
and necessary for her fresh start, but the court determined that
it is not only the exempt assets of a Chapter 7 debtor that aid in the
"fresh start," but also the discharge of the Debtor's unsecured debts.
In order for a debtor to receive the discharge of unsecured debts, a
potential Chapter 7 debtor 13must file a bankruptcy petition along
with the Chapter 7 filing fee.

In a similar case, In re Phillips,Chapter 7 debtors filed a motion
to waive the payment of the case filing fee. 14 The court reviewed the
motion in accordance with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. §
1930(f)(1).15 Upon review of their bankruptcy schedules, the court
took note of monthly expenses of $107 per month for cell phone service for two phones, $79 per month for satellite television service,
and $130 per month for Christmas Club payroll deductions.16 The
court denied the motion altogether because it was not persuaded
that the debtors were unable to pay the filing fee in installments in
light of their ability to pay for the convenience of two cell phones
and the Christmas Club payroll deductions. 17
The court in In re Lephew again denied a motion to waive the
Chapter 7 filing fee. 8 At the time they filed their petition, the debtors reported cash on hand of $5,050; on the day of the hearing on
the motion to waive the fee, the debtors reported this money was no
longer available to pay the fee because they used it to pay bills. 9
The court denied the motion because the debtors had sufficient
funds at the time they filed the petition to pay the filing fee. 20 The
court reasoned that it would be unfair to punish the debtor in the
aforementioned Davis case, who escrowed the filing fee prior to filing the petition, and to reward the current debtors who had sufficient funds at the time they filed their petition but chose to spend
2
those funds prior to the hearing. 1

12. Id. at 286.
13. Id. at 286 (internal citation omitted).
14.
15.
16.

375 B.R. 201, 203 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2007).
Id. at 204-05 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1930(f)(1) (2006)).
In re Phillips, 375 BR. at 207.

17. Id. at 207-08.
18. 380 B.R. 171, 172 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2007).
19. Id. at 174.
20.

Id. at 179.

21. Id. at 178.
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B. DisposableIncome, Means Testing, Dismissal Under § 707,
and Conversion
1. In re Lynch
In In re Lynch, the Chapter 13 trustee objected to the Chapter 13
plan proposed by an above-median income debtor, 22 arguing that
the debtor was not committing all disposable income to repay her
creditors because her disposable income calculation on Official
Form B22C included a vehicle ownership expense, even though the
debtor had no actual ownership expenses-she did not owe any
lease or finance payments. 2 The question in Lynch arose from the
instructions on the Official Form B22C:
Lines 27 through 29 of form B22C address allowed ownership expenses for debtor's transportation. Line 27 allows a deduction for vehicle operation or public transportation expenses. The debtor
checked the box stating that she pays operating expenses for one vehicle, and entered the appropriate Local Standard amount of
$260.00. Line 28 allows a deduction for ownership/lease expense for
up to two owned vehicles. A check-box prompts the debtor to select
whether she claims an ownership/lease expense for one, or two or
more vehicles. The debtor claims only one vehicle. According to the
instructions on the form, the debtor is to enter in sub-part a "the
amount of the IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership Costs,
First Car (available at www.usdoj.gov/ust/ or from the clerk of the

22. The court explained the meaning and relevance of having above-median income:
The debtor's schedules . . . include Official Form B22C which provides a

summary of the debtor's income and expenses in accordance with 11 U.S.C. §
1325(b)(3). The debtor is the only member of her household. According to this
form, the debtor's total gross monthly income, derived from her average
monthly income during the six months prior to filing the bankruptcy petition,
is $4,541.52. Annualized, this current income amounts to $54,498.24. In Virginia, the median income for a single person household is $45,143.00. Therefore, the debtor's income is above the median and the debtor must propose a
chapter 13 plan with a commitment period of 5 years according to §
1325(b)(4). Further, the debtor must determine her disposable income in accordance with § 1325(b)(3).
Section 1325(b)(3) requires the debtor to calculate her disposable income
in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2), popularly known as the "means
test," which is also used in determining eligibility for chapter 7.
In re Lynch 368 B.R. 487, 488-89 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007). For further discussion of the
means test, see David Gray Carlson, Means Testing: The Failed Bankruptcy Revolution of
2005, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 223 (2007); Kathleen Murphy & Justin H. Dion, "Means
Test" or "Justa Mean Test" An Examination of the Requirement that Converted Chapter 7
Bankruptcy Debtors Comply with Amended Section 707(b), 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 413

(2008).
23. In re Lynch, 368 B.R. at 488-90.
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bankruptcy court)"; in sub-part b the debtor is to enter the "total of
the Average Monthly Payments for any debts secured by Vehicle 1,
as stated in line 47"; finally, the allowed net ownership/lease expense for the vehicle is determined by subtracting sub-part b from
sub-part a. In sub-part a the debtor inserted the ownership cost of
$471.00, which, according to the United States Trustee's website, is
the ownership expense allowed for one car in Virginia. The debtor
listed no average monthly payment on debts secured by that vehicle
in line 47 and likewise entered zero in sub-part b of line 28. Therefore, the total ownership/lease expense claimed by the debtor is
$471.00 - 0 = $471.00. The debtor does not claim
an ownership ex24
pense for a second car, and line 29 is inapplicable.

The court followed the majority of published cases and allowed
the ownership expense deduction even though the car was owned
outright.15 The court listed five factors in support of its decision: (1)
statutory construction canons and the legislative history supported
allowance of the expense deduction; (2) Congress intended to create
a bright-line rule that would minimize flexibility for judicial interpretation; (3) the use of IRS standards would place the judiciary in
the role of enforcing IRS mandates; (4) the Official Form B22C itself referenced the clerk of the bankruptcy court and the office of
the U.S. Trustee's website as the source for allowable standard deduction amounts, divorcing other IRS sources or manuals from the
process; and finally, (5) the IRS guidance documents must be applied uniformly, if at all-a discontinuous result would be achieved
if debtors who pay a positive amount of debt or lease payment on a
vehicle were entitled to the entire amount of the IRS standard de2
duction expenseY.
The court concluded that the debtor was entitled
to use the deduction for ownership expense in the absence of any
actual positive payment on debt secured by the vehicle, or a lease
27
payment.
2. In re Hylton
In In re Hylton, a creditor objected to the debtors' proposed Chapter 13 plan pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) for two reasons:
first, the plan did not satisfy the requirement that all the debtors'
income be committed to fund the Chapter 13 plan because they

24.
25.
26.

Id. at 489.
Id. at 491.
Id. at 491-92.

27.

Id. at 492.

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:201

claimed ownership expense deductions for two cars that would be
owned free and clear of liens during some portion of their plan, and
for a boat, which the creditor argued was an impermissible expense;
and second, the plan proposed an applicable commitment period
that is less than the sixty months required for above-median debtors."8 The court first found that the debtors were above-median
debtors, for which "the amount of disposable income is determined
by using the means test provided for in Section 707(b)(2)."19 Next,
the court concluded that the ownership expenses claimed for the
two vehicles were allowable even though the vehicles would be
owned outright during the plan period.30 Similarly, the court concluded that the debt for the boat falls squarely within §
707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I) as debt contractually due to a secured creditor
within the sixty months following the petition, that §
707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(II) was not relevant, and that payments on the boat
were not reasonably necessary for the debtors' maintenance and
support." However, the court noted that confirmation of a plan un32
der § 1325(a)(3) requires that payments on it be filed in good faith,
and it cited other courts' denial of confirmation of Chapter 13 plans
3
that propose to pay for nonessential or luxury assets.
Lastly, the court concluded that the plain language of §
1325(b)(4)(A) reflects a temporal requirement, thereby rejecting the
debtors' argument that it instead reflects only a monetary requirement-a so-called "multiplier" approach, where "a confirmable plan
need only include an amount of projected disposable income equal
to that which would be received during the 'applicable commitment
period.' 34 The court noted that Congress could have used a multiplier approach in § 1325(b)(4)(A) as it had in various other Code sections added by BAPCPA, but by not doing so, Congress did not intend for the multiplier approach to be used. 35 The court denied

28. In re Hylton, 374 B.R. 579, 581 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2007). The Chapter 13 trustee also
objected to the plan and raised the same issue of plan duration that was raised by the creditor. Id. at 581 n.5.
29. Id. at 582 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3) (2006)).
30. Id. at 584.
31. Id. at 585, 586 (quoting and citing 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)).
32. In re Hylton, 374 B.R. at 586 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3)).
33. Id. at 586 (citing In re Kasun, 186 B.R. 62, 63-64 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995)).
34. Id. at 587; see 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4)(A).
35. In re Hylton, 374 B.R. at 587-88 & n.10 (citing In re Slusher, 359 B.R. 290, 301-02
(Bankr. D. Nev. 2007); Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993)).
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confirmation of the plan because it did not propose the required sixty-month applicable commitment period. 36
For similar results when a debtor deducts expenses for property
that will be surrendered during the plan, see In re Hoskings 7 and
3 8
In re Degrosseilliers.
In Degrosseilliers,the court made this important observation: "The disposable income test requires that a debtor's projected disposable income over the applicable commitment
period 'be applied to make payments to unsecured creditors under
the plan."'3 9
Thus, where a plan also pays secured and priority claims, it is not
sufficient that the plan payment equals projected disposable income.
Secured and priority debts (including the chapter 13 trustee's fee)
are already accounted for in the disposable income calculation. Accordingly, the payments into the plan must equal at least the debtor's disposable income over the commitment period plus the
amounts needed to pay secured and priority debts under the plan.4"

Moreover, the court in In re Demesones noted that the deduction of
expenses for property the debtor intends to surrender is a factor to
consider when deciding whether a case is abusive under the totality
41
of the circumstances test codified in § 707(b)(3).
3. In re Parulan
In re Parulan involved an above-median income debtor whose
monthly disposable income was $576; however, the debtor proposed
a plan payment of only $45 1. 42 The Chapter 13 trustee objected to
confirmation of the plan because the debtor deducted an expense
for a vehicle that she intended to surrender. 43 The debtor did not
address the Chapter 13 trustee's argument, but instead argued that
special circumstances existed-the loss of overtime pay to which
she was accustomed-for which there is no reasonable alternative

36. In re Hylton, 374 B.R. at 588.

37. No. 07-13785-RGM, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1785, at *18-20 (Bankr. E.D. Va. May 29,
2008) (holding that an above-median debtor's deductions should be determined as of the petition date and without regard to whether the debtor intends to surrender the collateral).
38. No. 08-10942-SSM, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2017, at *8 (Bankr. E.D. Va. July 11, 2008)
(following the analysis in Hoskings, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1785).
39. Id. at *11 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B)).
40. Id. at *11-12.
41.
42.

406 B.R. 711, 714 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2008) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3)(B)).
387 B.R. 168, 169 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2008).

43.

Id. at 170.
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but to downwardly
adjust the debtor's income pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
44
§ 707(b)(2)(B).
This Code section has both procedural and substantive requirements that must be met for the court to consider such a downward
adjustment based on special circumstances. Procedurally,
the debtor is required (1) to itemize additional expenses or adjustments; (2) to provide documentation of additional expenses or adjustments; (3) to provide a detailed explanation of the special circumstances that make the additional expenses or adjustments
necessary and reasonable; and (4) to give oral testimony under oath
to the accuracy of the information provided. 45

Substantively, the debtor is required "(1) to demonstrate 'special
circumstances, such as a serious medical condition or a call or order
to active duty in the armed forces' that justify the additional expense or income adjustment; and (2) to demonstrate that there is no
reasonable alternative to making the additional expense or income
adjustment."46
The court found that the debtor had not complied with the procedural requirements, and even if that failure was "not fatal to her
claim of special circumstances, the evidence offered [fell] short of
meeting the substantive standard contemplated by the statute,"
which was an extremely high standard to meet.47 The court also
found that the debtor failed to show that the circumstances were
permanent--"[b]y its very nature, overtime tends to fluctuate." 8
Additionally, "the debtor did not provide any evidence to show that
there was no reasonable alternative (such as taking on a second job)
to mitigate any loss of take-home pay resulting from a reduction or
elimination of overtime."49 For that reason, the court denied confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan. 0

44. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B) (2006).
45.

In re Parulan, 387 B.R. at 171 (citing In re Pageau, 383 B.R. 221, 225 (Bankr. D.N.H.

2008)).
46. Id. at 172 (quoting In re Harman, 366 B.R. 307, 311 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) (emphasis
omitted)).
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 171-72.
Id. at 173.
Id.
See id.
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4. In re Plumb
In In re Plumb, an unsecured creditor filed an objection to confirmation of the above-median income debtors' plan, arguing that
the debtors were not paying all of their projected disposable income
to the unsecured creditors under the terms of the plan due to increased deductions based on household size. 51 When they filed for
bankruptcy, the debtors' household included seven people, besides
themselves, who were children, grandchildren, and greatgrandchildren.5 2 One additional person lived in the house that was
not a relative, but became engaged to one of the relatives in the
household.5 3 No one aside from the debtors contributed to monthly
54
expenses.
The unsecured creditor argued that deductions should
only be allowed for the debtor, the debtor's spouse, and the dependants of the debtor, pursuant to § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii).5 5 But Official
Form B22C instructs debtors to deduct expenses based on "family
size," not the number of dependents.5 6 The court resolved the question by "defer[ring] to Form B22C because of the specificity of the
instructions on the form and because it recognizes the actual living
situation of many families." 57 The court found that the debtors'
"family size" included themselves and the seven family members,
58
but excluded the non-family-member fianc.
5. In re Buck
The court in In re Buck noted that BAPCPA changed the mechanics of calculating disposable income for above-median debtors,
but did not change the definition of "projected."55 The modifier "projected" simply means that disposable income, calculated by the method mandated by statute, must be multiplied out over the number
of months covered by the plan.60 Because courts are no longer given

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
2007).
60.

373 B.R. 429, 431-32 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2007).
Id. at 431.
Id. at 432.
Id.
Id. at 436; see 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2006).
In re Plumb, 373 B.R. at 437.
Id.
Id. at 438.
No. 07-31513-KRH, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 4272, at *7-8 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Dec. 14,
Id. at *10 (citing In re Alexander, 344 B.R. 742, 749 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006)).
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discretion in determining "projected disposable income," there will
be instances where debtors are left with either less than or more
than they actually need to make their plan payments.
6. In re Wolf
In re Wolf is an interesting discussion of a debtor whose Chapter
7 case was dismissed as abusive for various reasons and who was
ineligible for Chapter 13 because of his debt limits. 61 The court
found that, in addition to the means test implemented by BAPCPA
to determine whether the presumption of abuse arises for abovemedian income debtors, the Code incorporates the judicial constructs of bad faith and totality of the circumstances." The court determined that pre-amendment rules would still be instructive postBAPCPA because in the Fourth Circuit the ultimate decision on
bad faith is reached through a totality of the circumstances test rather than by application of a per se rule. 6 The court held that
Chapter 7 relief would be an abuse under such rules. The debtor
argued that his ineligibility for Chapter 13 relief-because of the
debt limitations in § 109(e)-meant that § 707(b) should not apply.65
The court did not find the debtor's argument persuasive, noting
that it
views eligibility for relief under another chapter as having either no
or very minimal relevance to the proper framework for analyzing
dismissal. There is no constitutional right to bankruptcy relief. The
issue is whether a debtor should receive a Chapter 7 "fresh start."
Where abuse is present the case should be dismissed without regard
to the availability of relief under some other chapter. Relief is reserved for the "honest but unfortunate debtor," not the abusive deb66
tor.

61. 390 B.R. 825, 830, 833-34 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2008).
62. Id. at 831-32.
63. Id. at 831.
64. Id. at 833.
65. Id. at 833-34; see 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006).
66. In re Wolf, 390 B.R. at 834 (internal citations omitted). For further discussion of this
dilemma and other constitutional questions under BAPCPA, see Samuel L. Bufford & Erwin
Chemerinsky, ConstitutionalProblems in the 2005 Bankruptcy Amendments, 82 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 1, 39 (2008) ("It remains to be seen to what extent courts will exercise their discretion to
deny a motion to dismiss or convert, where the debtor (a) is subject to the means test, (b) fails
the test, and (c) fails to show exceptional circumstances.").
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7. In re Grubbs
In In re Grubbs, the Chapter 13 trustee objected to confirmation
67
of the debtor's plan because the term was less than sixty months.
The married debtor filed this case individually and reported total
monthly household income of $8,670.95, of which $4,270.95 was attributable to the debtor and $4,400 was attributable to the debtor's
husband. 68 Using Official Form B22C, the debtor took a deduction of
$2,900 from her monthly income "to exclude [the] portion of the income [from] the non-filing spouse that was not regularly contributed toward expenses of the [diebtor's household."69 On line 15, the
debtor calculated her annual income as $69,251.40, which is belowmedian for a household of the debtor's size in Virginia.70 Therefore,
she determined that her applicable commitment period was only
thirty-six months rather than the required sixty months for abovemedian debtors.7 The trustee argued that the deduction was improper and that annualized current monthly income must include
both spouses' income, which would result in an above-median income for the debtor and thus a commitment period of sixty
months.7 2 The court disagreed with the trustee's interpretation of §
1325(b)(4)(A)(ii) that both spouses' incomes should be included in
the total. 73 The court interpreted the definition of "current monthly
income" in § 101(10A) to mean that a debtor must only include his
74
or her income and not that of a non-filing spouse.
8. In re Minahan
In In re Minahan, the debtors made pre-confirmation monthly
payments of $1,650 to the trustee.7 5 The debtors' prepetition car
payments were $1,042, and after the trustee's commission of
$112.20, $495.80 was left available for other purposes. 6 While this

67. No. 07-32822-KRH, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 4282, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Dec. 14,
2007).
68. Id. at *2.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at *3.
73. Id. at *5-6 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4)(A)(ii) (2006)).
74. In re Grubbs, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 4282 at *6; see 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A).
75. 394 B.R. 116, 121 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2008).
76. Id. at 127.
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could be applied to other debts, including attorney's fees, §
1326(a)(1)(C) provides that, unless the court orders otherwise, the
excess should be paid to the secured auto creditors as adequate protection." The court concluded that adequate protection payments
must "come off the top" and are payable to secured creditors before
payment of anything else in the case, because to do otherwise would
improperly subvert the priority scheme devised by Congress.,'
9. In re Wyatt
In this Chapter 13 case, the court reviewed whether disability
payments from the Veterans Administration ("VA") must be included as income in the calculation of projected disposable income
for above-median debtors.7 9 The court denied confirmation. 0 The definition of "current monthly income" in § 101(10A) unambiguously
requires the addition of income "from all sources."81 VA disability
compensation is not one of the named exceptions, and the debtor
could not offer any cases that held otherwiseY Indeed, at least two
3
other courts have held that this income is not excepted.
10. Marramav. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts
In Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts, a case governed
by the pre-BAPCPA Code, Chapter 7 debtor Marrama misrepresented the value of his out-of-state real property, as well as whether
he had transferred it in the preceding year. 4 The Chapter 7 trustee
stated his intent to recover the property as an asset of the bankruptcy estate.8 5 As a result, Marrama moved to convert to Chapter
13, but both the trustee and respondent bank objected and argued
that the conversion request was in bad faith and would be an abuse
of the bankruptcy systemY.

77. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1)(C).
78. In re Minahan, 394 B.R. at 127-28.
79. No. 08-14792-SSM, 2008 WL 4572506, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Oct. 10, 2008).
80. Id.
81. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A) (emphasis removed)).
82. Id. at *2.
83. See In re Waters, 384 B.R. 432, 438 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 2008); In re Hedge, 394 B.R.
463, 466 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2008).
84. 549 U.S. 365, 368 (2007).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 368-69.
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The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the bankruptcy court's judgment that denied the motion to convert, reasoning
that the debtor forfeited his right to a Chapter 13 conversion by his
prepetition bad faith conduct.17 Such conduct established "cause" for
dismissal of a Chapter 13 case or reconversion to Chapter 7, while
also rendering him ineligible to be a Chapter 13 debtor.8 8 Because
the Bankruptcy Code conditions conversion on a debtor's ability to
qualify as a "debtor" under Chapter 13, Marrama could not convert
from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13, regardless of his contention that the
Code gives an unqualified right of conversion. 9 Bankruptcy judges
have broad authority to take any action necessary "to prevent an
abuse of process," and such authority is "adequate to authorize an
immediate denial of a motion to convert," rather than allowing the
conversion to go forward and only postpone the inevitable dismissal
or reconversion of the Chapter 13 case for "cause," which postponement could provide a debtor with time "to take action prejudicial to creditors."90
11. Musselman v. eCast Settlement Corp.
In Musselman v. eCast Settlement Corp., an unsecured creditor
with a claim comprising forty-eight percent of the above-median
debtors' total unsecured debt objected to confirmation of the proposed fifty-five month Chapter 13 plan, arguing that it failed to pay
all of the debtors' projected disposable income to unsecured creditors and did not propose the correct commitment period. 91
The district court held that "projected disposable income" is
merely the debtor's "disposable income" calculated under Official
Form B22C and projected forward over the applicable commitment
period.9 2 Moreover, where debtors have zero or negative projected
disposable income, there is no applicable commitment period because "there is nothing 'to be received in the applicable commitment

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 373-74, 376.
Id. at 372-74.
Id.
Id. at 375.
394 B.R. 801, 804-05 (E.D.N.C. 2008).
Id. at 813.
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period" and "nothing to 'apply] to make payments to unsecured
creditors under the plan."' 93 The creditor's objections were rejected. 4
C. Reaffirmation9l
1. In re Husain
In In re Husain, the court noted that the debtors' counsel had not
certified that the reaffirmation agreement submitted by the debtors
did not impose an undue hardship in accordance with 11 U.S.C. §
524(c)(3).9 6 The court found that even if counsel had endorsed the
reaffirmation agreement, further scrutiny would have been required by the court pursuant to § 524(m).97 Because the debtors'
schedules indicated there was insufficient income to pay for regular
monthly expenses plus the car payments, § 524(m)'s rebuttable presumption of undue hardship applied. 98
In order to rebut this presumption, the debtor must: (1) explain
where the extra money will come from to make the payments; (2)
"demonstrat[e] that the value of the asset exceeds.., the debt to be
assumed"; or (3) "prov[e] to the satisfaction of the [c]ourt that the
[dlebtors' need for the vehicles outweighs the [c]ourt's consideration
of the sources" of the extra money or the undersecured nature of the
asset.9
The court found that the debtors submitted insufficient evidence
of additional sources of funds:
The evidence advanced by the Debtors to rebut the presumption on
the first point included the statement of Debtor Akhter Husain that
"I expect to close the gap between my income and expenses with an
expected raise and through working more hours."... As this projected additional income would still leave the Debtors with a deficit

93. Id. at 814 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (2006)).
94. Id. at 820.
95. For a complete discussion of reaffirmation under 11 U.S.C. § 524 after BAPCPA, see
Lisa A. Napoli, Reaffirmation After the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Act of
2005: Many Questions, Some Answers, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 259 (2007).

96. 364 B.R. 211, 214-15, 216 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(3)).
97. Id. at 216 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 524(m)).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 217.
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of expenses over income of approximately $3,000.00 per month, the
Court finds that it is insufficient to overcome the § 524(m) presumption of undue hardship. 10 0

The debtors concentrated their efforts primarily on the third
point, namely expressing to the court their concerns that the ipso
facto clause in their loan documents would be triggered despite being current on payments and maintaining proper insurance. 1 1 The
court reasoned that while a loss of the vehicle would prove to be a
great hardship, that hardship alone is an insufficient reason for the
court to approve what was clearly an unduly burdensome agree02
ment. 1
The court did not end the analysis there, however. It further explained that ipso facto clauses in installment loan contracts are
generally unenforceable as a matter of law.0 3 BAPCPA carved out
an exception to this general rule in § 521(d), and the exception requires debtors to comply with § 362(h)(1) and (2).10 The court reasoned that the timely filing of the mutually satisfactory reaffirmation agreements is sufficient to satisfy the standards of § 521(d). 10
The court's decision not to approve the reaffirmation agreement
was entirely out of the hands of the debtors; the court's refusal to
approve such agreements is not equivalent to a failure on the part
of the debtors to comply with § 521(d) and thereby trigger the enforcement of ipso facto clauses. The court did not approve the reaffirmation agreements, but found that the debtors had fully, timely,
and in good faith performed their duties under §§ 521(a) and
06
362(h).
2. In re Milby
In In re Milby, the debtor asked the court to rule that he met the
statutory obligations of 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a) and 362(h) for reaffirmation of the debts associated with his two automobile loans or, in

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 217-18.
103. Id. at 218 (citing Home Owners Funding Corp. v. Belanger (In re Belanger), 962 F.2d
345, 348 (4th Cir. 1992); Riggs Natl Bank v. Perry, 729 F.2d 982, 985 (4th Cir. 1984)).
104. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 521(d) (2006).
105. In re Husain, 364 B.R. at 218; see 11 U.S.C. § 362(h)(1)-(2).
106. In re Husain, 364 B.R. at 219.
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the alternative, to approve the reaffirmation agreements.10 7 At the
hearing on the motion, debtor's counsel represented that she was
unable to execute Part C of the reaffirmation agreement as it was
clear there was a presumption of undue hardship based on the debtor's schedules.0 8 There was no evidence presented to rebut the presumption of undue hardship. 10 9
The court was concerned that the debtor was asking for a declaratory judgment with which he might be able to prevent the lender
from exercising its contractual ipso facto rights post-discharge despite the post-discharge injunction."0 The debtor provided no evidence to support his fear of this action, and there was no evidence
proffered to suggest the lender might attempt this action."' The
court determined that in order for it to have subject-matter jurisdiction for a declaratory ruling, there must be a substantial controversy between the parties." 2 The court found that there was no evidence proffered suggesting such a controversy existed, and it denied
the motion."'
The court went on to explain that even if it had subject-matter
jurisdiction, the debtor did not prove good faith as an element of the
reaffirmation process.14 The court cited In re Husain and noted that
Milby's situation presented different facts:
In this case, it appears that the Debtor's intention in entering into a
reaffirmation agreement with the Bank was solely to comply with
the requirements of sections 362(h) and 521(a), in order to obtain a
ruling that section 521(d) is not operative and that the Bank is
stayed by the postdischarge injunction. In Husain, footnote fourteen
states:
In some circumstances, a reaffirmation agreement entered into
by the debtor in good faith may satisfy the requirements of §§
362(h), 521(a)(6) and 521(d) where the court disapproves the
reaffirmation agreement under § 524(c)(6), especially where, as
here, the debtor intends to perform under the reaffirmation

107. 389 B.R. 466,466-67 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2008).
108. Id. at 467.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 467-68.
111. Id. at 468.
112. Id. (quoting Bank of N.Y. v Adelphia Commc'ns Corp. (In re Adelphia Commc'ns),
307 B.R. 432, 437 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 468-69.

20091

BANKRUPTCY LAW
agreement and where disapproval by the court is beyond the
debtor's control." 5

D. Motor Vehicle Issues
1. Tenants by the Entirety Ownership
The debtors in In re Rodriguez, a Chapter 7 case, attempted to
exempt their motor vehicles by claiming a tenancy by the entirety
exemption. 116 Section 522 of the Code allows debtors to utilize tenancy by the entirety exemptions to the extent such property is
"'exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law."' 7 Under Virginia law, property that is held by the entirety is not subject
to enforcement of debts of an individual spouse. 11 8 The question was
whether motor vehicles could be held by the entirety. 119 Citing Virginia Code section 55-20.2(A), the debtors argued that vehicles are
personal property and that Virginia law allows for personal property to be held as tenants by the entirety.120 The trustee objected and
argued that Virginia Code section 46.2-622 trumps section 5520.2(A)--"[t]he question is whether § 55-20.2(A) which allows personal property in general to be held as tenants by the entirety is limited by § 46.2-622 which prohibits motor vehicles from being held
as tenants by the entirety."12' The court found that while both statutes were relevant, section 46.2-622 was more specific on the issue,
12
and therefore the court disallowed the claimed exemption.
2. Surrender in Full Satisfaction
a. Tidewater Finance Co. v. Kenney
Tidewater Finance Co. v. Kenney was a direct appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit from the

115. Id. (quoting In re Husain, 364 B.R. 211, 219 n.14).
116. 406 B.R. 707, 708 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2008).
117. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B) (2006)).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 708-09.
120. Id. at 709 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 55-20.2(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008)).
121. Id. at 710 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-622 (Repl. Vol. 2005 & Cum. Supp. 2008);
id. § 55-20.2(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008)).
122. Id. at 710-11.
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bankruptcy court. 123 The bankruptcy court had determined that
when a car was purchased within 910 days of the filing of the bankruptcy case, the debtor may surrender that car back to the secured
creditor in full satisfaction of the debt. 124 The importance of this ruling stems from the depreciating value of vehicles-often more is
owed than the vehicle is worth, and the creditor is secured to the
extent of the fair market value but unsecured for the balance.'25 Allowing surrender in full satisfaction eliminated the ability of the
26
creditor to file a deficiency claim for the unsecured portion.'
Under BAPCPA, Congress revised § 1325 of the Code to provide
that a debtor may not bifurcate the claim secured by a vehicle that
was purchased for the personal use of the debtor within 910 days of
27
the filing, rendering § 506 inapplicable for so-called 910 carsY.
The court reasoned that once Congress removed the § 506 valuation method from the equation for 910 cars, debtors and creditors
are left to their rights as determined by state law. 28 Citing Butner
v. United States, 29 the court stated that it was a well-recognized
principle that state law controls when the Bankruptcy Code fails to
provide a remedy. 0 The court further reasoned that regardless of
the fact that § 506 is not applicable under these circumstances, it is
actually § 502 that determines whether a claim is allowed.'3 ' The
creditor was allowed to file a deficiency claim for the unsecured por132
tion.
b. In re Walker
In In re Walker, the debtor had filed her third petition for bankruptcy protection in two years. 133 In the third case, the debtor proposed to bifurcate the claim of her car lender, as the car had been

123. 531 F.3d 312, 314 (4th Cir. 2008).
124. Id. at 315 & n.2.
125. See 11 U.S.C. § 506 (2006).
126. See Tidewater Fin. Co., 531 F.3d at 318.
127. 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (2006).
128. Tidewater Fin. Co., 531 F.3d at 320.
129. 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).
130. Tidewater Fin. Co., 531 F.3d at 319.
131. Id. (quoting In re Wright, 492 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2007)); see 11 U.S.C. §§ 502,
506 (2006).
132. Tidewater Fin. Co., 531 F.3d at 321.
133. No. 07-11819, 2008 WL 2559420, at *1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. June 23, 2008).
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purchased outside of the 910-day window prescribed by the hanging
paragraph in § 1325. The lender objected to the plan as having
been filed in bad faith because the two previous plans had provided
for the creditor to be paid as a fully secured claim. 135 The debtor
purchased the car within 910 days of filing those previous cases. 136
M

The court reviewed the standards for determining good faith as
31 The
set forth in Deans v. O'Donnel113' and Neufeld v. Freeman.1
court also discussed a similar case, In re Robinson, in which the
debtor miscalculated the time between the car purchase and the filing of the case. 139 The debtor in that case was off by a few days and
was required to pay the car in full because of the hanging paragraph. 410 The case was then dismissed, and the debtor filed another
case, to which the creditor objected.14 ' The debtor admitted that she
let the first case be dismissed because she would realize a substantial savings by filing a new case.' 42 The court in In re Robinson
found that the filing of the new case did not rise to the level of bad
faith merely because the debtor filed it to realize substantial savings. 143

In In re Walker, the debtor's first case was dismissed because she
lost her job and was unable to make the payments required.'- The
second case was dismissed because the debtor was out of work for a
week with sick children, and she incurred medical bills from which
she could not catch up. 4 ' The court found that these were reasons
beyond the control of the debtor and did not rise to the level of behavior exhibited in In re Robinson, which was still found to be in
good faith.' 46 The court overruled the objection and confirmed the
47
plan in the third case.'

134. Id. at *2; see 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006).
135. In re Walker, 2008 WL 2559420, at *1-2.
136. Id. at *2.
137. Id. at *3 (citing Deans v. O'Donnell, 692 F.2d 968, 970 (4th Cir. 1982)).
138. Id. (citing Neufeld v. Freeman, 794 F.2d 149, 150 (4th Cir. 1986)).
139. Id. at *4 (citing In re Robinson, No. 07-41562-13, 2008 WL 2095349, at *1 (Bankr. D.
Kan. May 16, 2008)).
140. See In re Robinson, 2008 WL 2095349, at *1.
141. Id.
142. Id. at *2.
143. Id. at *7.
144. 2008 WL 2559420, at *1.
145. Id. at *2.
146. Id. at *5; see In re Robinson, 2008 WL 2095349, at *7.
147. In re Walker, 2008 WL 2559420, at *5.
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3. Negative Equity
In GMAC v. Home, the district court consolidated the appeals of
bankruptcy court decisions in the cases of In re Pajot and In re Lavigne.'48 In these cases, the debtors had purchased vehicles for
which the total amount financed included (1) the purchase price of
the new vehicles; (2) negative equity from loan balances attached to
vehicles that the debtors traded in at the time of the new vehicle
purchase; and (3) other costs, such as extended warranties and gap
insurance.19 The debtors were attempting to bifurcate the creditors'
claims in their Chapter 13 plans, proposing to pay the secured
claims to the extent of the cash purchase price of the new vehicle
and the unsecured claims to the extent of the negative equity, extended warranty, gap insurance, and fees. 5 '
In In re Pajot, the debtor attempted to bifurcate the secured
claim of a creditor by reducing the amount secured to the retail
value of the vehicle and treating the negative equity portion of the
note as an unsecured claim. 151 The court held that negative equity
was neither part of the price of the car, nor was it part of the value
given or used to obtain rights in the collateral. 152 In instances where
the debt is not entirely purchase-money security, the Uniform
Commercial Code ("UCC") uses two different approaches to determine how the debt is treated.'5 3
The "[tiransformation rule" holds that a security interest that is part
purchase-money and part non-purchase-money completely loses its
purchase-money character and is entirely transformed into a nonpurchase-money security interest. The "dual status rule" allows the
court to treat the portion that is purchase-money (essentially the
purchase price) as purchase-money, whereas the non-purchasemoney portion remains non-purchase-money and is treated accordingly.14

The bankruptcy court held that the negative equity portion of the
transaction was not a purchase-money debt and could be bifur-

148.
LEXIS
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

390 B.R. 191, 194 (E.D. Va. 2008) (citing In re Lavigne, No. 07-30192, 2007 Bankr.
4187 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007); In re Pagot, 371 B.R. 139 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007)).
Id.
Id. at 195.
371 B.R. at 144.
Id. at 151.
Id. at 157.
Id. (citations omitted).
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cated based on the dual status rule. 15 5 In In re Lavigne, the bankruptcy court went further and held that creditors did not have a
purchase-money security interest in extended warranty contracts
or any insurance policies such as gap insurance.'56
On appeal to the district court, the creditors argued that the
"package deal" the debtors agreed to for the purchase of the vehicles
included the negative equity, extended warranty contracts, and the
insurance policies, plus the cash purchase price of the new vehicles-so the entire amount financed was a purchase-money obligation. 157 As a purchase-money obligation, the debtors should be required to pay the entire balance in full as a secured claim in their
58
Chapter 13 plan.
The district court found that "state law controls what constitutes
a purchase money security interest" and held that the creditors had
a purchase-money security interest in amounts advanced to debtors
to pay off negative equity on the trade-in vehicles."9 The court held
that these amounts "may be considered as a component of the 'price'
and of the 'value given to enable,' and, consequently, that the creditors maintain purchase money security interests in the negative
equity financing.' 60 However, the court held that gap insurance and
other insurance and warranties do not possess the requisite close
nexus with the collateral and therefore cannot be considered as part
of the purchase-money obligation. 6'
The Fourth Circuit recently addressed this same issue in In re
Price, holding that negative equity along with gap insurance and
other warranties are included with the new car purchase price in
the purchase-money security interest.'6 2 The court explained:
[Interpreting "purchase-money obligation" to include debt relating
to negative equity is unlikely to cause endless bundling of various
obligations with the purchase of a car. And we therefore see no need
to create artificial distinctions between negative equity financing
and the other common components of motor vehicle transactions to
ward off that implausible result. Rather, our recognition of the wide-

155.

Id. at 154, 157-58.

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

2007 Bankr. LEXIS 4187, at *43.
GMAC v. Home, 390 B.R. at 196-97.
See id. at 205.
Id. at 197, 205.
Id. at 205.
Id. at 205-06.
562 F.3d 618, 628 n.5 (4th Cir. 2009) (interpreting North Carolina law).
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spread inclusion of negative equity financing in new motor vehicle
contracts is faithful to the UCC's own guidance on interpreting its
provisions.163

E. The Chapter 7 Discharge
1. Smith v. Jordan (In re Jordan)
In Smith v. Jordan (In re Jordan),the trustee filed an adversary
complaint seeking revocation of the debtor's discharge after learning the debtor had refinanced her home without the knowledge and
consent of the trustee or court.' Because revocation of a Chapter 7
discharge under § 727(d)(3) is an extraordinary remedy and contrary to the policy of the "fresh start" in bankruptcy, § 727(d) is
"'construed strictly against the party seeking the revocation and
liberally in the debtor's favor.'1 65 The court must find a willful and
1 66
intentional lack of compliance with a relevant court order.
In this case, debtor's lack of compliance was not willful. The court
order at issue-the standard administrative order issued to all debtors in bankruptcy informing them of their duties under the Codedid not specifically prohibit "refinancing" but, instead, prohibited
the "selling, transferring, removing, destroying, mutilating or concealing" of property. 67 It is not likely apparent to the average debtor
that refinancing may technically involve a transfer in connection
with the execution of the deed of trust. 618 The burden to clarify such
restrictions is not on the debtor, but on the "business-savvy drafters
of the administrative order."1 69 "Simply put, the administrative order drafters should have anticipated-and specifically prohibitedsuch action because refinancing is one of the most common methods
1 70
by which a homeowner may affect the equity in his or her home."

163. Id. at 627.
164. 521 F.3d 430, 432-33 (4th Cir. 2008).
165. Id. at 433 (quoting Pierce v. Fuller (In re Fuller), 356 B.R. 493, 495 (Bankr. D.S.D.
2006)); see 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(3) (2006).
166. In re Jordan, 521 F.3d at 433; see 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(3) (discussing revocation of a
discharge for refusal to obey a lawful court order).
167. In re Jordan, 521 F.3d at 435.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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2. Tidewater Finance Co. v. Williams
In Tidewater Finance Co. v. Williams, the debtor received a discharge under Chapter 7 in 1996, and then filed another Chapter 7
case in March 2004-before BAPCPA.' 71 Between these two filings,
the debtor also filed three Chapter 13 cases, each of which was dismissed.' 2 In 2001, Tidewater Finance Company ("Tidewater") ob73
tained a judgment against the debtor.
Tidewater filed a motion objecting to the debtor's discharge (accompanied by the appropriate adversary proceeding) in the debtor's
new case.'7 4 Tidewater argued that the debtor was ineligible for discharge under § 727(a)(8). '1 5 The motion acknowledged that the preBAPCPA Bankruptcy Code, which governed all of the debtor's cases, required the debtor to wait six years between Chapter 7 discharges, and that more than seven years had passed since the debtor's first discharge. 176 However, Tidewater argued that the period
was equitably tolled for the duration of each Chapter 13 case, and
177
as a result, the debtor was not eligible for a discharge.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the bankruptcy court, which held that "'[e]quitable tolling
is not applicable here because § 727(a)(8) does not define a limitations period for Tidewater, a creditor, to assert its claim,"' but instead 'defines a condition that [the Debtor] was required to satisfy
78
in order to qualify for ... a discharge of her debts.'11

3. Nabso, Inc. v. Holmes (In re Holmes)
In Nabso, Inc. v. Holmes (In re Holmes), the creditor filed a motion objecting to the debtor's Chapter 7 discharge prior to the expiration period for filing objections to discharge and subsequently
filed an adversary proceeding.'7 9 The time period had twice been ex-

171. 498 F.3d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 2007).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) (2006).
176. Tidewater Fin. Co., 498 F.3d at 253.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 254 (quoting Tidewater Fin. Co. v. Williams (In re Williams), 333 B.R. 68, 73
(Bankr. D. Md. 2005).
179. 393 B.R. 95, 97 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2008).
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tended by the creditor's motions, but the adversary proceeding was
180
filed two months after the last extension.
The bankruptcy court held that the creditor's motion objecting to
discharge did not satisfy the timeliness requirements of the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.' The creditor should have filed a
third extension of time within the time provided by the prior motions.
The bankruptcy court held that it lacked authority to extend the
time period for filing an adversary proceeding once the time expired, and therefore it dismissed the complaint. 2
F. Claims
The district court in Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. McDow (In
re Garriock)was asked to review "whether 'the legal rate' of interest
owed to claimants under 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(5) refers only to the
federal judgment rate or whether it encompasses prepetition con1 83
tracts between a claimant and the debtor."
The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's judgment that
"the legal rate" of § 726(a)(5) is the federal judgment rate as determined by 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a).8 4 Citing In re Cardelucci, the district
court concluded that "[bly awarding interest at 'the legal rate' rather than at 'a legal rate,' Congress signaled that a single source
should be used to calculate post-petition interest." 8' The awarding
of post-petition interest should affect all creditors equally because
"[tihe cost of delay affects all creditors equally, and the federal
judgment rate accurately reflects the time value of each creditor's
claims."

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
2002)).
186.

186

Id. at 96-97.
Id. at 97-98; see FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(a)-(b).
In re Holmes, 393 B.R. at 98.
373 B.R. 814, 815 (E.D. Va. 2007); see 11 U.S.C. § 226(a)(5) (2006).
In re Garriock, 373 B.R. at 817; see 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(5); 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a).
In re Garriock, 373 B.R. at 816 (citing In re Cardelucci, 285 F.3d 1231, 1234 (9th Cir.
Id. (citing In re Godsey, 134 B.R. 865, 867 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1991)).
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G. Dischargeability
The ultimate goal of any consumer bankruptcy is for the debtor
to receive a discharge. Discharges in consumer bankruptcy are governed by 11 U.S.C. §§ 727 and 1328 and are the pinnacle of completion of any case. 187 However, there are certain instances where
the debtor is not entitled to a discharge for particular debts. Section
8
523 of the Bankruptcy Code lists the exceptions to discharge. 1
Some of the most recently litigated dischargeability issues include
those of student loans, false pretenses, willful and malicious injury,
fraud or defalcation in a fiduciary capacity, larceny, and debts arising from domestic support obligations.1 9 The party seeking to except the debt from discharge bears the burden of proof by prepon190
derance of the evidence.
Government-issued or -backed student loans are generally not
dischargeable unless the debtor can prove that repayment of such
debt would be detrimental to the debtor or the debtor's dependents.8 ' The Fourth Circuit ruled in two recent cases that student
loan debt is non-dischargeable if the debtor is unable to satisfy the
undue hardship test adopted by the Second Circuit in Brunner v.
New York State Higher Education Services Corp.192 The Brunner
factors include a showing
(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and
expenses, a "minimal" standard of living for [the debtor and the debtor's dependents] if forced to repay the loans; (2) that additional circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the student
loans; and (3) that the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay
193
the loans.

187.

See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727, 1328.

188. 11 U.S.C. § 523.
189. See generally 10 NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3d 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2009).
190. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 291 (1991).

191.

See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).

192.

See Spence v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Spence), 541 F.3d 538, 544 (4th Cir.

2008); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Frushour (In re Frushour), 433 F.3d 393, 400 (4th Cir.
2005); see generally Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396

(2d Cir. 1987).
193.

Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396.
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The debtor must prove these factors by a preponderance of the evidence. 194
In In re Spence, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's
judgment that the student loan debt was non-dischargeable. 19 The
court applied the three-part Brunner test and found that the debtor
failed to satisfy parts two and three.s Despite her education and
ability to attain a higher paying job, the court found that the debtor
did not attempt to improve her financial situation and that her current situation was not indicative of what the future held. 97 In addition, the court concluded that the debtor failed the third part of the
test for failing to maximize her income by pursuing a higher paying
line of work and by not attempting to pay or explore the options for
repayment of the student loans, including loan consolidation.19
The Fourth Circuit in Educational Credit Management Corp. v.
Mosko (In re Mosko) reversed the district court's affirmation of the
bankruptcy court's holding, granting the debtors discharge of their
student loans.'9 9 As in In re Spence, the court held that the debtors
failed to show efforts to obtain employment, maximize income, and
minimize expenses, thereby not satisfying the third prong of the
Brunner test.2 0 0 Lastly, the court found that the debtors did not put
forth any effort to repay their student loan obligation when there
was a surplus in their budget, nor did they seek alternative payment arrangements like loan consolidation.201
In the Western District of Virginia, the bankruptcy court denied
discharge of student debt in Hooker v. Educational Credit Management Corp. to a Chapter 7 debtor who had a history of making
very nominal income, had been diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic, and was HIV-positive, stating that the debtor failed to satisfy
the third prong of the Brunner test because he did not seek partici-

194. See In re Frushour, 433 F.3d at 400 (citing O'Hearn v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp.
(In re O'Hearn), 339 F.3d 559, 565 (7th Cir. 2003); Brightful v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Brightful), 267 F.3d 324, 327 (3d Cir. 2001)).
195. 541 F.3d at 545.
196. Id. at 544-45.
197. Id. at 544.
198. Id. at 545.
199. 515 F.3d 319, 327 (4th Cir. 2008).
200. Id. at 324-25. The court decided not to consider whether the debtors satisfied the
other two prongs of the test after it found that they failed to satisfy the "good-faith effort"
portion. Id. at 324.
201. Id. at 326.
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pation in an income contingent repayment plan. 20 2 On appeal, the
district court remanded the case to the bankruptcy court for a more
dispositive factual basis to deny the discharge.0 3
Similarly, the bankruptcy court in Shank v. Educational Credit
Management Corp. (In re Shank) denied the discharge of student
loan debt because the debtor failed to satisfy the third prong of the
Brunner test.2° The debtor filed a Chapter 7 case, receiving her discharge in October 2005, and the case was closed in November
2005.205 Thereafter, in August 2007, the debtor moved the court to
reopen her case so that she could request the discharge of her student loan debt under § 523(a)(8). 20 6 The court found that the debtor
failed to prove that she acted in good faith to repay her student
loans. 20 7 Specifically, the debtor admitted that she did not seek employment, relied solely on Social Security income, and did not reduce expenses or attempt to participate in the repayment plan offered by the lender."8
Vujovic v. DirectLoans (In re Vujovic) is of particular interest because the court deferred its ruling on the discharge of student debt
for two years to determine whether the second prong of the Brunner
test could be satisfied.20 9 The debtor in this case was a forty-oneyear-old consumer bankruptcy attorney who incurred a substantial
amount of student loan debt from pursuing his law degree and license to practice. 210 The court held that the debtor satisfied prongs
one and three of the Brunner test,211 but because the debtor could
not show by a preponderance of the evidence that his current financial state would persist throughout the repayment period, the court
exercised its equitable power under § 105(a) to defer its ruling and

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

368 B.R. 502, 503 (W.D. Va. 2007).
Id. at 505.
No. 05-73943-FJS, 2008 WL 3166492, at *7 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2008).
Id. at *1.
Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B) (2006).
In re Shank, 2008 WL 3166492, at *10.
Id. at *4-6.
388 B.R. 684, 688 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2008).
Id. at 687.
Id. at 688.
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enjoin any collection efforts from the lenders for two years.212 The
court explained that
[w]hat is needed here, is time. Although [the debtor] cannot at this
moment demonstrate a "certainty of hopelessness," it is not fair to
the debtor to make a premature assessment of his prospects and to
permanently deny him the relief he seeks. A better solution is to deny his request on an interim basis, and to re-evaluate his situation
two years from now.213

1.

Nondischargeability Under § 523(a)(4) for Fraud or
Defalcation in a Fiduciary Capacity

In Kubota Tractor Corp. v. Strack (In re Strack), the Fourth Circuit established a two-part test for a creditor seeking nondischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4), which requires the creditor to
show "(1) that the debt in issue arose while the debtor was acting in
a fiduciary capacity; and (2) that the debt arose from the debtor's
fraud or defalcation."214 In In re Strack, the creditor also had to establish that the corporation's actions could be imputed to the debtor
to prevent him from receiving a discharge for a debt he guaranteed
for the corporation. 2 5 The court relied on Virginia law to define "express trust" and to impute a fiduciary duty on Strack as an officer
of the corporation.216 The court held that the debt was nondischargeable because (1) the debtor personally guaranteed the indebtedness; (2) the indebtedness arose due to defalcation or the breach of
a fiduciary relationship by the corporation; (3) the debtor, as an officer of the company, was personally responsible for the conduct
that gave rise to the corporation's breach or defalcation; and (4) the
debtor's conduct rose to the level of a breach of his fiduciary duty to
21 7
the corporation as its president.

212. Id. at 692-94 ("[11 U.S.C.] section 105(a) provides that the court 'may issue any order, process or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this
title. No provision of this title providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall
be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.") (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006))).
213. Id. at 692.
214. 524 F.3d 493, 497 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Pahlavi v. Ansari (In re Ansari), 113 F.3d
17, 20 (4th Cir. 1997)); see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).
215. In re Strack, 524 F.3d at 498 (citing Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Ellison (In re Ellison), 296 F.3d 266, 270-71 (4th Cir. 2002)).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 500 (citing In re Ellison, 296 F.3d at 271).
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Although the Fourth Circuit resorted to state law in In re Strack
to help determine whether to except the discharge under §
523(a)(4), in In re Shreve, the bankruptcy court rejected the expansive definition codified by Virginia and relied on federal common
law for the definition of larceny. 18 In In re Streve , the creditor, who
was one of the debtor's suppliers, brought an adversary proceeding
to determine the dischargeability of money loaned and allegedly
misused according to state law. 219 The court agreed that while the
debtor's actions may have met the state law definition of larceny,
the definition of larceny for purposes of applying § 523(a)(4) is a
matter of federal common law.220 The violation of a state statute
does not automatically preclude the discharge of the debt owed to
2 2
the creditor. 1

2.

Nondischargeability of Domestic Support Obligations and the
Doctrine of Res Judicata

Generally, domestic support obligations are not dischargeable.2 22
The usual question is whether the debt is a domestic support obligation as defined in 11 U.S.C § 101(14A). 221 In Monsour v. Monsour
(In re Monsour), the bankruptcy court denied discharge of a lump
sum owed to the debtor's ex-wife after their divorce because it was a
domestic support obligation. 224 The Chapter 7 debtor had filed a motion to reopen his previous bankruptcy case, and filed an adversary
proceeding on the same day, to determine the dischargeability of
the lump sum award to his ex-wife. 225 The question was whether the
lump sum was a domestic support obligation or a debt owed under a
property settlement agreement-the former is not dischargeable

while the latter is.226 Although whether or not the lump sum obligation is in the nature of support is a matter of federal bankruptcy
law rather than state law, "[blankruptcy courts and state courts

218. Smith Mtn. Bldg. Suppy, LLC v. Shreve (In re Shreve), 386 B.R. 602, 605 (Bankr.
W.D. Va. 2008).
219. Id. at 603.
220. Id. at 606; see also Nat'l Agents Serv. Co. v. Duiser (In re Duiser), 12 B.R. 538, 53940 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1981) (stating that a state's determination that certain conduct is criminal is not determinative of the issue of dischargeability in bankruptcy).
221. See In re Shreve, 386 B.R. at 606.
222. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2006).
223. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) (defining "domestic support obligation").
224. 372 B.R. 272, 282 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2007).
225. See id. at 276.
226. Id. at 277.
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maintain concurrent jurisdiction to decide... exceptions to discharge arising under... Section 523(a)(5), which excepts from discharge any debt to a spouse for alimony, support or maintenance
made in connection with a divorce decree." 217 The court found that
the debtor was barred from bringing the adversary proceeding
based on the doctrine of res judicata because the state court divorce
decree constituted a final judgment, an identity of the cause of action existed because the debtor argued to the state court that he
had received a discharge of the lump sum obligation, and the same
281
parties would be in both sets of litigation.
Even though the court disposed of the case with its holding on res
judicata, it went on to reiterate that the intent of the parties at the
time they enter into the agreement is critical in determining the
classification of indebtedness. 22 "Factors relevant to a determination of intent include the language and substance of the judgment,
the financial circumstances of the parties, and the role of the obli23
gation." 0
3. False Pretenses, Willful and Malicious Injury
Sections 523(a)(2) and (a)(6) are designed to protect creditors who
are manipulated into giving money or property to debtors and creditors injured by the torts of debtors.23 1
In order to except a debt from discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A), a
creditor must prove that the debtor obtained money by fraud, specifically that (1) the debtor made a fraudulent misrepresentation,
(2) that induced the creditor to act or refrain from acting, (3) that
caused harm to the creditor, and (4) that was justifiably relied upon

227. Id. at 278 (citing In re Crawford, 183 B.R. 103, 107 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1995)); see 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(5).
228. In re Monsour, 372 B.R. at 277-78.
229. Id. at 281 (citing Tilley v. Jessee, 789 F.2d 1074, 1078 & n.4 (4th Cir. 1986) ("Intent
clearly remains the threshold that must be crossed before any other concerns become relevant.")).
230. Id. at 281 (citing Catron v. Catron (In re Catron), 164 B.R. 912, 919 (E.D. Va. 1994)).
231. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2), (a)(6); see also Nunnery v. Rountree, (In re Rountree), 478
F.3d 215, 219-20 (4th Cir. 2007) ("Congress intended § 523(a)(2) to protect creditors who
were tricked by debtors into loaning them money. . . through fraudulent means."); Harrold v. Raeder (In re Raeder), 399 B.R. 432, 440 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 2009) ("Section
523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a discharge in bankruptcy does not apply
to any debt that arises from the 'willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity.- (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2008)).
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by the creditor.23 2 For a creditor to prevail under § 523(a)(6) for a
willful and malicious injury, the court must find that the debtor in233
tended both the act and the injury that resulted.
In Haas v. Trammell (In re Trammell), the debtor's former boyfriend brought an adversary proceeding to except from discharge a
debt based on fraud and willful and malicious injury. 234 The court
found that the ex-boyfriend failed to prove that the debtor maliciously prosecuted him in a child abuse case or that he was fraudulently induced to make a loan to the debtor. 23 The court held that
236
the debts were not excepted from discharge.
In El-Yacoubi v. Hetrick (In re Hetrick), the plaintiff brought an
adversary proceeding seeking to quiet title to real estate and seeking relief against the debtors for slander of title and trespass.237 Additionally, the plaintiff sought to except the indebtedness resulting
from the husband-debtor's actions from discharge as a willful and
malicious injury under § 523(a)(6).23 8 The court, finding that the
deed in question was a forgery, entered summary judgment against
the debtors and the holder of a mortgage on the property and
quieted title to the real estate. 239 The court also entered default
judgment on nondischargeability against the husband-debtor based
upon his willful and malicious actions in transferring the proper240

ty.

H. Exemptions
1. In re Price
In In re Price, after eighteen months of extensive discovery, the
Chapter 7 trustee found that the joint debtors failed to report a to-

232. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).
233. See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61 (1998) ("The word 'willful' in [§ 5231(a)(6)
modifies the word injury, indicating that nondischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury.").
234. 388 B.R. 182, 186, 188 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2008).
235. Id. at 194-95.
236. Id. at 195.
237. 379 B.R. 612, 614 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007).
238. Id. at 620.
239. Id. at 617-18.
240. Id. at 620-21.
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tal of more than $428,000 in various assets. 241 These undisclosed assets were non-exempt property of the estate that the trustee had
the ability to use, sell, or lease. 42
The court held that the trustee could set off any exempt funds
against the debtors' liability to the estate for failing to turn over the
undisclosed assets.2 43 Alternatively, the trustee could surcharge
their exemption, by taking would-be exempt assets to compensate
the estate for the property that the debtors concealed or refused to
244
surrender.
When the debtors deprive the estate of assets and cause significant administrative expenses, such a result is necessary "'to protect
the integrity of the bankruptcy process and to ensure that [debtors]
exempt an amount no greater than what is permitted by the exemption scheme of the Bankruptcy Code."1 4 The amount of the setoff can be any portion of the value of the undisclosed assets, plus
administrative expenses incurred by the trustee as a result of the
debtor's failure to comply or the amount necessary to pay all claims,
246
whichever is less.
2. Logan v. Williams (In re Williams)
In Logan v. Williams (In re Williams), the Chapter 7 trustee objected to the tenancy by entireties exemption claimed by the debtor
for property owned with his estranged spouse, whom he eventually
divorced, and sought to set aside a refinancing agreement as an un24 7
authorized post-petition transfer.
Under the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, a party in interest must file any objections to claimed exemptions "within 30
days after the meeting of creditors.., or within 30 days after any
amendment to the list or supplemental schedules is filed, whichever
is later."248 When an objection is filed after thirty days, regardless of
the propriety of the exemption claimed, the objection is not consi-

241. 384 B.R. 407, 408-09 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2008).
242. Id. at 409; see 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2006).
243. In re Price, 384 B.R. at 410.
244. Id. at 412.
245. Id. at 411-12 (quoting Latman v. Burdette, 366 F.3d 774, 786 (9th Cir. 2004)).
246. See id. at 412.
247. 400 B.R. 479, 483-86 (Bankr. D. Md. 2008).
248. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b).
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dered by the court, and the exemption is allowed up to the full
amount declared. 49 In In re Williams, the court denied the trustee's
objection, explaining that the trustee's indefinite continuance of the
§ 341 meeting of creditors, his failure to announce a new date to reschedule the meeting, and his failure to object to the exemption for
50
almost ten months after the last § 341 meeting was unreasonable.1
The court did not give the trustee an extension of time to object to
the debtor's claimed exemption. 251 As such, the tenancy by entireties
property owned with the non-debtor spouse was properly claimed
as exempt and removed from the bankruptcy estate. 25 2 Therefore,
25 3
the refinancing did not run afoul of the automatic stay.
I. Credit Counseling & FinancialManagement
1. In re Lilliefors
In In re Lilliefors, a pro se debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 7
without including a copy of the credit counseling certificate in Exhibit D, but certified under penalty of perjury that he had completed the required credit counseling. 254 He failed to file a completed certificate and failed to appear at the § 341 meeting of
creditors.2 5 Both the Chapter 7 trustee and United States trustee
filed motions to prevent the case from being dismissed due to the
significant assets that would be distributed to creditors and the
lack of assurance that creditors would be paid if the case were
2 6
dismissed.
The court held that an individual is judicially estopped from disavowing his own sworn statement, and under the circumstances,
the debtor was deemed to have satisfied the credit counseling requirement even without any further documentation.2 57 The motions
25 8
were granted, and the case was not dismissed.

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

See Taylor v. Freeland & Kron4 503 U.S. 638, 642 (1992).
400 B.R. at 489-91.
Id. at 491.
Id. at 493-94.
Id. at 495-96.
379 B.R. 608, 610 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007).
Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 341 (2006).
In re Lilliefors, 379 B.R. at 610-11.
Id. at 611.
Id. at 612.
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2. In re Taing
The debtor in In re Taing failed to file a certificate of completion
of the financial management course required by § 727(a)(11) of the
Bankruptcy Code. 259 Upon the debtor's motion to reopen the case in
order to file the certificate, the court explained that certain requirements must be met in order for the motion to be granted:
"[lThere must be a reasonable explanation for the debtor's failure
to comply with the requirement and counsel's failure to monitor
the debtor's compliance; no prejudice to creditors; and a timely request for relief. 2 60 In addition, the debtor's ignorance of the requirement was not a reasonable excuse given the court's written
notice of the requirements to every debtor, as well as counsel's responsibility to advise the debtor of the credit counseling requirement.2 61 Similarly, counsel's failure to timely recognize the noncompliance was also not a reasonable excuse, as counsel was well
aware of the requirement and deadline and had twenty-four hour
Internet access to the court's electronic filing system. 262 Without sa263
tisfying the requirements, a case could not be reopened.
J. Special Issues in Chapter 13
1. Co-Debtor Stay
The issue in Morris v. Zabu Holding Co. (In re Morris) on appeal
to the district court was "whether the bankruptcy court abused its
discretion when it determined that a balancing of the equities favored retroactive annulment of the co-debtor stay" imposed by 11
U.S.C. § 1301.264
In this case, the creditor obtained relief from the stay as to the
debtor, but not as to the co-debtor, and foreclosed on the debtor's
real property. 26' The debtor's counsel moved the court to set aside

259. No. 07-13776-RGM, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1528, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Va. May 14,
2008); see 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(11).
260. In re Taing, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1528, at *1-2.
261. Id. at *2.
262. Id. at *2-3.
263. Id. at *3-4.
264. 385 B.R. 823, 828 (E.D. Va. 2008); see 11 U.S.C. § 1301 (2006).
265. In re Morris, 385 B.R. at 826.
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the foreclosure and reimpose the stay.2 6 The purchaser of the real
property had already obtained a mortgage on the property and was
unaware that relief as to any co-debtor had not been obtained.267 In
balancing the equities, the bankruptcy court retroactively granted
relief from the co-debtor stay, thus validating the foreclosure
sale. 268 The parties agreed that the balancing of the equities test
was appropriate, so the district court was left to consider whether
the bankruptcy court had abused its discretion by retroactively
annulling the co-debtor stay.269 Because the bankruptcy court
would have granted relief as to the co-debtor if it had been so
moved by the creditor, and because the mortgage company who financed the purchase after the foreclosure lacked knowledge as to
the lack of relief from the co-debtor stay, the district court held
that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion and had correctly applied the balancing of the equities test.2 0 The bankruptcy
271
court's judgment was therefore affirmed.
2. The Chapter 13 Plan
a. Murphy v. O'Donnell (In re Murphy)
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1329, the terms of a confirmed Chapter
13 plan may be modified upon request by the debtor, the Chapter
13 trustee, or unsecured creditors at any time before the completion of payments.2 7 2 Courts have held that the doctrine of res judicata prevents modification of the confirmed plan unless there is a
showing by the moving party of substantial and unanticipated
273
changes in the debtor's financial condition.
In Murphy v. O'Donnell (In re Murphy), the debtor filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, and the court confirmed the debtor's plan,
which proposed to pay a 37% dividend to all unsecured creditors.274
Less than eight months after confirmation, the debtor filed a mo-

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
Arnold
274.

Id.
Id. at 826-27.
Id. at 827-28.
Id.
Id. at 830-31.
Id. at 831.
11 U.S.C. § 1329 (2006).
See, e.g., Murphy v. O'Donnell (In re Murphy), 474 F.3d 143, 149 (4th Cir. 2007);
v. Weast (In re Arnold), 869 F.2d 240, 243 (4th Cir. 1989).
In re Murphy, 474 F.3d at 147.
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tion to sell real property.2 75 Due to the fair market appreciation of
the debtor's real property, he would receive more than $80,000.00
in net proceeds from the sale. 276 The Chapter 13 trustee moved the
court to modify the debtor's confirmed plan to pay all unsecured
creditors 100% of their claims filed in the case, requiring that approximately $30,000 of the proceeds from the sale be paid to the
trustee.2 77 Based on this evidence, the bankruptcy court found that
there was a substantial and unanticipated change in the debtor's
financial condition and, therefore, it granted the trustee's motion
to modify the confirmed plan to pay 100% to all unsecured creditors. 78 On appeal, both the district court and the Fourth Circuit
concluded that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in
granting the trustee's motion to modify the confirmed plan. 79 Even
though property of the estate revests in the debtor upon confirmation under 11 U.S.C. § 1327, that did not preclude the court from
20
granting the trustee's motion to modify the confirmed plan.
b. In re McLain
In In re McLain, the issue was whether the court could confirm a
Chapter 13 plan that proposed to modify a secured creditor's claim
when the debt was secured by a mobile home that was also the
debtor's principal place of residence.281
Section 1322(b)(2) provides that a Chapter 13 plan may not modify the rights of a secured creditor with a security interest in real
property that is the debtor's principal residence.2 8 2 Section
101(13A) defines a debtor's principal residence to include a mobile
home. 2813 In In re McLain, the secured creditor, objecting to confirmation of the debtor's plan, argued that reading § 1322(b)(2) in
conjunction with § 101(13A) created an ambiguity.2 8 Therefore, the
creditor argued that the debtor should not be allowed to modify the

275. Id.
276. See id. at 147 & n.5.
277. Id. at 147.

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

In re Murphy, 327 B.R. 760, 772 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005).
In re Murphy, 474 F.3d at 147, 154.
Id. at 153-54 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b) (2006)).
376 B.R. 492, 493 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2007).
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2); In re McLain, 376 B.R. at 493.
11 U.S.C. § 101(13A).
In re McLain, 376 B.R. at 494.
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creditor's claim secured by the mobile home. 28 5 The debtor argued
that there was no ambiguity between the two code sections as §
1322(b)(2) applies only when the debtor's principal residence is also
real property. 28 6 The court agreed with the debtor that there was no
ambiguity, and it held that the debtor could modify the creditor's
rights.2 87 The mobile home was personal property, and the restriction on modification of a loan secured by real property did not ap88
ply.2
c. In re Poole
In In re Poole, a divorce decree provided that Mr. Poole would
maintain payments for two credit card accounts, pay half of Ms.
Poole's attorney's fees, and execute a note in favor of Ms. Poole,
with monthly payments due until paid in full. 289 Mr. Poole executed
the required note on March 1, 2007 and filed for Chapter 13 relief
on June 6, 2007.290 Ms. Poole filed a proof of claim for the amount of
the note as a priority domestic support obligation and attached a
copy of the divorce decree.291 The note was scheduled as an unse292
cured debt in the case.
Ms. Poole objected to the plan confirmation, arguing that each of
the obligations set forth in the divorce decree were domestic support obligations as defined by § 101(14A), and as such, they were
entitled to full priority under § 507(a)(1)(A) and were nondischarge-able pursuant to § 523(a)(5). 293 Additionally, Ms. Poole
raised allegations of bad faith, arguing that Mr. Poole filed for
bankruptcy shortly after the divorce and that he had previously
294
filed for bankruptcy.
The court first addressed bad faith. Mr. Poole testified that the
previous case was due to medical bills from an accident. 295 Without

285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 494, 496.
See id. at 495-96.
383 B.R. 308, 310 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2007).
Id.
Id.
Seeid. at 311.
Id. at 312; see 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(14A), 507(a)(1)(A), 523(a)(5) (2006).
In re Poole, 383 B.R. at 312.
Id.
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further evidence showing a lack of good faith, and after considering
the plan, which included a provision to pay his portion of the debt
at issue, the court could not find any reason to conclude that Mr.
96
Poole was proceeding in bad faith.1
In addressing claim treatment, the court explained that a "domestic support obligation," as defined in § 101(14A), is a debt
"'owed to or recoverable by. . . a spouse [or] former spouse,"' or a
debt "'in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support.., of such
spouse [or] former spouse."' 97 In determining whether the debt is
in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support, the court must
look to federal law and must consider whether the obligation was
intended to be for support. 9 Here, the agreement between Mr. and
Ms. Poole did not label or indicate any obligation in the nature of
alimony, maintenance, or support. 99 In family court, Ms. Poole's
attorney stated that the agreement was in the nature of debt allocation.300 The record in the family court gave little insight into the
30 1
intent behind the agreement other than as debt allocation.
After weighing all of the relevant factors and considering all of
the evidence, the court could not find that the debts in question
qualified as a "domestic support obligation," and accordingly, they
were not entitled to priority treatment under § 507(a)(1)(A). 30 Mr.
Poole met his burden of proof, and Ms. Poole's objection to the plan
3
on these grounds was overruled. 03
d. IRS v. White (In re White)
In IRS v. White (In re White), the IRS held a claim secured by
personal property of the debtors .304 The plan treatment of a secured
claim is governed by § 1325(a)(5), providing that if the secured
creditor does not accept the plan, a debtor may either invoke a

296. Id.
297. Id. at 312-13 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101 (14A)).
298. See id. at 314 (citing In re Davis, No. 06-10581-DHW, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 953, at

*6-7 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. Mar. 15, 2007)).
299. Id. at 315.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 316.
303. Id.
304. 487 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2007).
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"cram-down" or surrender the property subject to the lien.3 °5 The
debtors' plan in In re White proposed to satisfy the IRS's secured
claim in part by a partial cram-down and partial surrender of the
personal property securing the claim, with the remaining secured
value to be paid through the plan.3 16 The IRS objected to confirmation on several grounds, among which was that the debtors were
not surrendering property because the property in question was
exempt from administrative levy. 07 The bankruptcy court overruled the objection, finding that the partial surrender was appropriate and that, because the property was exempt from levy, the
IRS's claim was unsecured. 30 8 On appeal, the district court reversed
the bankruptcy court, holding that the IRS's claim was not rendered unsecured by the inability of the IRS to levy on the property,
and also that under the circumstances of the case, the debtors
"could not be said 'to have "surrendered" their property in any
meaningful fashion."' 30 9
On further appeal of the surrender issue by the debtors, the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court, explaining that the debtors' retention of property that is legally insulated from collection
was inconsistent with surrender10
3. The Chapter 13 Discharge
In Branigan v. Bateman (In re Bateman), which consolidated
appeals from two bankruptcy cases, the Chapter 13 trustee argued that because the debtors were ineligible for discharges under
11 U.S.C. § 1328(f), they were not permitted to file a Chapter 13
31
petition. '
The Code provides that
the court shall not grant a discharge of all debts provided for in the
plan ... if the debtor has received a discharge-(1) in a case filed
under chapter 7, 11, or 12 of this title during the 4-year period preceding the date of the order for relief under this chapter, or (2) in a

305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

See id. at 202-03 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a)(5)(B), (C) (2006)).
See id. at 203.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 204 (citing United States v. White, 340 B.R. 761, 765-67 (E.D.N.C. 2006)).
Id. at 207-08; see 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(C).
515 F.3d 272, 275 (4th Cir. 2008); see 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f).
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case filed under chapter 13 of312
this title during the 2-year period preceding the date of such order.

One of the debtors, Bateman, previously filed for Chapter 7
bankruptcy protection on March 25, 2005, and received a discharge
on June 29, 2005. 313 He filed for Chapter 13 relief on December3 12,
2005, in order to stop a pending foreclosure on his residence. 14 If
3 15
confirmed, his Chapter 13 plan would have paid all claims in full.
The other debtors, the Graveses, filed a joint Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on January 4, 1999, and received a discharge on
June 16, 2004.316 Similarly, they filed a joint Chapter 13 case on
317
February 7, 2006, to prevent a foreclosure.
The Chapter 13 trustee argued that the Graveses were ineligible
to file because § 1328(f)(2) prohibits a discharge in a Chapter 13
case filed within two years of the date of discharge of a previous
bankruptcy2'1 The United States Trustee filed a motion in opposition to the Chapter 13 trustee's motion, "arguing that the Graveses
were indeed eligible for a discharge under § 1328(f) because the period during which a discharge is prohibited runs from the date of
filing in the prior bankruptcy case to the date of filing in the
319
present Chapter 13 case."
The bankruptcy court adopted the 'filing date to filing date' interpretation" and therefore concluded that the Graveses were eligible for discharge because their filings were more than seven
years apart.3 0 The bankruptcy court thus confirmed the Graveses'
3
plan. 21
To resolve the Bateman's case, the Fourth Circuit had to "decide
whether an individual may file a Chapter 13 petition if he is ineligible for a discharge under § 1328(f)." 22 In that section, the Code

312. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f).
313. In re Bateman, 515 F.3d at 275.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 276.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. (citing In re Graves, No. 06-10634-TJC, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1274 at *7-9
(Bankr. D. Md. Jan. 19, 2007)).
321. Id. (citing In re Graves, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1274 at *22-23).
322. Id. at 277.
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never uses the word "filing"--only "discharge"-and it does not appear to limit the eligibility provisions of § 109(e). 23 As such, "the
plain language of § 1328(f) does not prohibit a debtor who is inelig24
ible for a discharge from filing a Chapter 13 petition."
Bateman's case provided for full payment of all allowed claims. 3 25
The court therefore held that the Chapter 13 filing was in good
faith, and it affirmed the district and bankruptcy court's orders
denying the trustee's motion to dismiss and confirming Bateman's
3 26
Chapter 13 plan.
III. BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY CASES
A. Bad Faith in Chapter 11
The debtor in In re Premier Automotive Services, Inc. filed its
Chapter 11 bankruptcy case only two days before the expiration of
its holdover, at-will tenancy on land it previously leased from the
State of Maryland.32 7 The court dismissed the case because it was
not filed in good faith, for various reasons.3 28 First, because the
lease had expired, the debtor did not have any interest in the property at the time the case was filed; hence, it was not property of the
bankruptcy estate.3 29 Second, the debtor was solvent and was seeking only to delay its eviction from the land, rather than to use the
bankruptcy process to reorganize its debts.330 Third, because the
expired lease was not property of the bankruptcy estate, the automatic stay did not apply.3 31 Finally, even though the debtor claimed
that negotiations with the state would lead to a renewed lease, this
unilateral belief did not give rise to a protected property interest
under the Due Process Clause.3 32 The court made short shrift of the
debtor's weak constitutional arguments when it explained:

323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

See id. at 281; 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(e), 1328(f) (2006).
In re Bateman, 515 F.3d at 281.
Id. at 283.
Id. at 283-84.
492 F.3d 274, 278 (4th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 277.
Id. at 280, 282.
Id. at 280-81.
Id. at 281.
Id. at 282.
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Above and beyond all that, Premier's various constitutional claims
are not only tenuous at best, but carry us far afield from the purposes of bankruptcy law in general and Chapter 11 petitions in particular. "The purpose of Chapter 11 reorganization is to assist financially
distressed business enterprises by providing them with breathing
space in which to return to a viable state." To allow resort to the
bankruptcy process for plainly meritless constitutional claims advanced solely to thwart lawful eviction would do nothing but subvert
the purposes of a Chapter 11 reorganization.33

B. Employee Retirement Income Security Act
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Beck v. PACE International Union, found that the debtor had not breached its fiduciary duties when it failed to consider a union's proposal regarding
the debtor's pension plan. 33, The union wanted the debtor to terminate its single-employer defined-benefit pension plan under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") by merging it
with the union's multi-employer plan23 5 The debtor's directors did
not accept the union's proposal, and the union sued, claiming that
the debtor's directors breached their fiduciary duties by not seriously considering the union's proposal.3 6 The Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC") argued to the Court that the union's proposal was not an accepted method of termination under
ERISA.3 37 The Court agreed with the PBGC and concluded that the
debtor did not breach its fiduciary duties, explaining:
Even from a policy standpoint, the PBGC's choice is an eminently
reasonable one, since termination by merger could have detrimental
consequences for plan beneficiaries and plan sponsors alike. When a
single-employer plan is merged into a multiemployer plan, the original participants and beneficiaries become dependent upon the financial well-being of the multiemployer plan and its contributing members. Assets of the single-employer plan (which in this case were
capable of fully funding plan liabilities) may be used to satisfy commitments owed to other participants and beneficiaries of the (possibly underfunded) multiemployer plan. The PBGC believes that this
arrangement creates added risk for participants and beneficiaries of

333. Id. at 284-85 (quoting In re Little Creek Dev. Co., 779 F.2d 1068, 1073 (5th Cir.
1986)) (internal citations omitted).
334. 551 U.S. 96, 110 (2007).
335. Id. at 99.
336. Id. at 100.
337. Id. at 104.
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the original plan, particularly in view of the lesser guarantees that
the PBGC provides to multiemployer plans. ..

C. Use, Sale, or Lease of Property
In the Chapter 11 case of In re The Holladay House, the district
court affirmed the bankruptcy court's judgment that D.M. Reid Associates, an inventory supplier, had a perfected security interest
only in the inventory it had conveyed to the debtor under a consignment agreement, not in the debtor's entire inventory.39
In the bankruptcy case, the debtor asked the court for authority
to use the cash collateral generated from the sale of its nonconsigned inventory. 340 D.M. Reid and another secured creditor
with a lien on the debtor's inventory objected to the debtor's motion
to allow use of its cash collateral. 341 As to the other secured creditor, the bankruptcy court found that the inventory was valued at
$623,145.07, the amount owed to the creditor was $86,070, and
that the debtor was paying adequate protection payments in the
amount of $3,500 per month.34 2 The bankruptcy court granted the
debtor's motion as it related to the other creditor because of the
equity cushion and the adequate protection payments-allowing
the debtor to use the cash collateral generated from the sale of its
3 3
inventory would not prejudice the other creditor. 1
Regarding D.M. Reid's purported security interest in the debtor's entire inventory, the bankruptcy court's analysis was more
complicated. D.M. Reid claimed that it had a security interest in
all inventory because the security agreement executed between it
and the debtor granted such a security interest.3 44 However, the
bankruptcy court found that the financing statement more narrowly defined the collateral as only the inventory that was conveyed to
the debtor on consignment. 345 D.M. Reid recorded the financing

338.

Id. at 110.

339. In re The Holladay House, Inc., No. 3:08cv286, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84405, at *1
(E.D. Va. Oct. 21, 2008).
340. In re The Holladay House, Inc., 387 B.R. 689, 690-91, 692-93 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
2008).
341. Id. at 691.
342. Id. at 691-92.
343. Id. at 692.
344. Id. at 693.
345. Id.
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statement along with the security agreement, but the financing
6
statement did not incorporate the broader security agreement.14
The bankruptcy court concluded that the more narrow financing
statement was therefore binding, and the court limited D.M. Reid's
7
lien to only the collateral conveyed to the debtor on consignment.'
The bankruptcy court reasoned that when a secured creditor
chooses to limit the description of its collateral in the financing
statement, and when the financing statement in turn describes
that particular property as the subject collateral, that limitation
overrides a more general collateral description that would be permitted by the UCC.348 Therefore, although the general description
in the security agreement would allow a lien over "inventory," the
financing statement in In re The Holladay House limited the collateral to "consigned goods," and so the financing statement controlled.3 49 If the financing statement had incorporated the security
agreement with the broad UCC description of "inventory," a title
examiner would have seen that in the record. 50 But because it was
not attached to the financing statement, the security agreement
did not create a perfected security interest in all inventory. 351 D.M.
Reid's perfected security interest therefore attached only to collateral conveyed to the debtor on consignment.3 52 Because the debtor's motion related just to non-consigned inventory, the bankruptcy court overruled D.M. Reid's objection to the debtor's use of cash
3 53
collateral.
Often in bankruptcy cases, a debtor's reorganization depends
upon a successful sale of its assets. What happens when a deal is
struck but the buyer backs out? The Bankruptcy Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia addressed this issue recently in Wood
v. Cumulus BroadcastingLLC (In re Wood), where the debtor filed
a motion to sell assets of the estate under an asset purchase
agreement for the sale of some radio stations it owned. 354 Cumulus

346. Id.
347. Id. at 695-96.
348. Id. at 695 (citing Nw. Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918,
921 (9th Cir. 1988)).
349. Id. at 697.
350. See id.at 696.
351. Id. at 695-96.
352. Id. at 697.
353. Id. at 698.
354. No. 00-14460-RGM, 2008 WL 2244972, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Va. May 30, 2008).
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Broadcasting LLC ("Cumulus"), as a competing bidder, filed an objection to the sale and claimed it was willing to pay $1 million more
than the bidder chosen by the debtor.3 5 The debtor's motion to sell
was therefore denied, and Cumulus and the debtor executed a
written agreement for the sale of the radio stations.35 6 However,
this new deal was never brought before the court.3 57 Cumulus thereafter declined to close the sale, and the debtor filed an adversary
proceeding against Cumulus for breach of contract.3 8 Cumulus
filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the
35 9
written agreement conditioned its obligation on court approval.
Until the court approved the deal, Cumulus argued that the writ3 60
ten agreement was merely a non-binding letter of intent.
The court disagreed with Cumulus and denied its motion for
judgment.3 6 In doing so, the court applied a three-step analysis:
First, is there a contract? Second, may one party to an otherwise
valid and enforceable contract unilaterally withdraw from the
agreement merely because the bankruptcy court had not yet approved the agreement? Third, should the contract be approved by
the bankruptcy court?362 The court explained, "[w]hat is particularly important is that the determination of whether there was an
agreement is separate and distinct from the court's approval of the
agreement. The reasons for approving an agreement are different
from determining whether there is an agreement." 36 3 The court
very aptly explained that bankruptcy changes the landscape-the
bankruptcy process brings third parties into the mix:
Bankruptcy is a community, multi-party proceeding seeking to adjust the obligations of the parties fairly among all the creditors and
interested parties. The purpose of court approval is to protect all of
the creditors and interested parties of the estate and to assure that
the proposed agreement is fair and reasonable under the circumstances. Outside bankruptcy, this determination is made by the parties to the agreement and is effective upon acceptance of an offer.
The parties to a non-bankruptcy agreement are not generally

355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *2 (citing In re Frye, 216 B.R. 166, 170-75 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997).
Id. (citing In re Frye, 216 B.R. at 174).
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charged with protecting third-party interests. Approval by the bankruptcy court is not the last step in creating a valid contract, [sic] it is
a necessary step to assure that the agreement reached by the parties
is fair and reasonable to the entire creditor community. A contrary
result undermines the bankruptcy process. Mischief can arise if a
party to a contract can simply withdraw
from it at any time before
64
the court approves the agreement.

The "mischief' referred to by the court is that once the debtor
chooses a buyer among competing bidders, the losing bidders will
move on while the court approval process is underway, which can
take time. 365 The court spelled out the mischievous result of adopting Cumulus' view of things: "If at this point the successful purchaser has the unilateral right to walk away from the deal, he has
effectively eliminated his competition and may threaten to walk
366
away unless the terms are changed more favorably to himself."
In this case, all of the material terms of the deal were included
in the written agreement.3 67 Even if the court has to approve the
deal before the debtor can close on the sale of assets under the contract, the parties are bound by the agreement as soon as it is
formed.368 The court retains the discretion to disapprove the deal
even though the parties are bound upon formation.3 69 The debtor
need not first obtain court approval before commencing its breach
of contract action, but it may have to prove that the court would
have approved the contract to recover on its breach of contract ac37 0
tion.
D. Property of the Estate
The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia recently issued opinions that define "property of the estate" under
various circumstances.3 1' In Millard Refrigerated Services, Inc. v.

364.
365.

Id.
See id.

366. Id.
367.
368.
369.
370.

Id. at *1.
Id. at *3.
See id.
Id.

371. See Frontier Pepper's Ferry, L.L.C. v. LandAmerica 1031 Exchange Servs., Inc. (In
re LandAmerica Fin. Group, Inc.), No. 08-03148, 2009 WL 1269578, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
May 7, 2009); Millard Refrigerated Servs., Inc. v. LandAmerica 1031 Exchange Servs., Inc.
(In re LandAmerica Fin. Group, Inc. II), No. 08-03147-KRH, 2009 WL 1011647, at *1
(Bankr. E.D. Va. Apr. 15, 2009).
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Land America 1031 Exchange Services, Inc., the bankruptcy court
concluded that funds held by the debtor in its bank accounts on the
petition date as part of "1031 exchanges" were not trust funds and,
therefore, were property of LandAmerica 1031's bankruptcy estate. 72 This holding impacted the distribution of those funds-if
the funds were held in trust, then the claimant would be entitled to
the return of his funds, and the funds would not be subject to the
claims of other creditors. If the funds were property of the estate,
as the bankruptcy court held, then the distribution of the funds
would follow the normal course in bankruptcy cases and the claimant would only hold a general unsecured claim against the debtor. This, of course, means that the exchanger would receive only
his pro rata share along with all the other unsecured creditors of
the debtor.
Relying on cases holding that parol evidence may not be offered
to prove a term that was not expressly stated in an integrated contract,373 the court in Millard found that the exchange agreement
between Millard and the debtor did not create a trust by its express terms.3 7 4 Therefore, Millard only held a claim for breach of
3 75
contract, an unsecured claim, against the debtor.
E. Utilities and Section 366
As a national big-box retailer, Circuit City received utility service from various utility companies at its 712 retail stores and nine
outlet stores throughout the country at the time it filed Chapter 11
bankruptcy376 The Bankruptcy Code contains a provision that prevents utility companies from cutting off service for a period of thirty days to a debtor that files a bankruptcy case.3 77 Importantly, the
general rule in subsection (a) of § 366 prohibiting the termination

372. In re LandAmerica Fin. Group, Inc. II, 2009 WL 1011647, at *11-12.
373. Lysk v. Criswell (In re Criswell), 52 B.R. 184, 197 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985); Robinette v. Robinette, 4 Va. App. 123, 127, 354 S.E.2d 808, 810 (Ct. App. 1987).
374. Millard, 2009 WL 1011647, at *12.
375. See id.
376. In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., No. 08-35653, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 237, at *2, *7-8
(Bankr. E.D. Va. Jan. 14, 2009).
377. See id. at *12; 11 U.S.C. § 366(a) (2006) ("Except as provided in subsections (b)
and (c) of this section, a utility may not alter, refuse, or discontinue service to, or discriminate against, the trustee or the debtor solely on the basis of the commencement of a case
under this title or that a debt owed by the debtor to such utility for service rendered before
the order for relief was not paid when due.").
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of utility service "is subject to two exceptions-the exception contained in subsection (b) and the exception contained in subsection
(c). '' 3 8 Subsection (b) provides that the "debtor must furnish what it
considers to be adequate assurance of payment within twenty days
after the petition date in the form of a deposit or other security for
postpetition service." 379 In this case, Circuit City furnished a
blocked account that the court found to be the equivalent of a letter
of credit, which constitutes an assurance of payment as required by
§ 366.380
The second exception, in subsection (c), provides that "a utility
company may discontinue service in a Chapter 11 case if it does
not receive 'during the 30-day period beginning on the date of the
filing of the petition.., adequate assurance of payment for utility

service that is satisfactory to the

utility.'' 3s

The court explained

that this subsection is susceptible to a strange interpretation:
Conceivably, under § 366(c)(2), the Debtors could receive a demand
from a utility company at the end of such thirty-day period and be
compelled to accede to the demand immediately or face termination
of critical utility services. On the other hand, the Debtors could re3 2
ceive no demand at all and nonetheless be subject to the same fate. 1

Circuit City, in an attempt to foreclose this strange result and "impose order on an otherwise disorganized and haphazard process,"
asked the court on the first day of its case to enter an order to establish procedures that would effectively implement the provisions
of § 366.33 The court held that it had the discretion, even after
BAPCPA, to modify the amount of adequate assurance and adopt
the procedures set forth in Circuit City's proposed order without
first waiting for the utility company to make a demand under subsection (c).3 84 As the court explained, "[tihe first clause of § 366(c)(2)

378. In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 237, at *12.
379. Id. at *13. This requirement does not equal an absolute guarantee of payment. Id.;
see 11 U.S.C. § 366(b) (2006).
380. In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 237, at *13.
381.
382.
383.
384.

Id. at *15 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 366(c)(2)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at *15-17.
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clearly renders the entire section subject to the court's authority
3s5
outlined in § 366(c)(3)."
The "court's authority" is summarized as follows:
Section 366(c)(3)(A) provides that "[o]n request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court may order modification
of the amount of an assurance of payment under paragraph (2)." Assurance of payment is defined in § 366(c)(1), and upon a request for a
hearing under § 366(c)(3)(A), the court must determine whether the
assurance of payment is adequate, operating within the restrictions
outlined in § 366(c)(3)(B). In sum, the court is authorized to modify
the assurance of payment pursuant to § 366(c)(3)(A) after notice and
a hearing, and a debtor is not required to first pay a demand that is
unilaterally satisfactory to the utility company."s

Therefore, because the court found that the blocked accountcum-letter of credit provided adequate assurance to the utility
companies as required by § 366, the court extended the thirty-day
injunction against disruption of utility service23 7 Doing so
"avoid[ed] a haphazard and chaotic process whereby each utility
could make extortionate, last-minute demands for adequate assurance which the Debtors would be pressured to pay under the
threat of losing critical utility service."3ss
F. Claims
The case of In re J.A. Jones, Inc. arose out of a tragic car accident in North Carolina.38 9 In January 2003 Laura Dunnagan died
after spending eighty-three days in the burn unit of the University
of North Carolina Hospital as a result of severe burns and other injuries she sustained in a car accident that occurred in a construction zone on a North Carolina interstate highway. 390 The general
contractor, Rea Construction Company ("Rea"), eventually became
one of the debtors in the In re J.A. Jones bankruptcy case.3 91 The
evidence showed that Rea knew about the accident shortly after it
occurred and that Rea notified Zurich American Insurance Com-

385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

Id. at *17 (citations omitted).
Id. at *18; 11 U.S.C. § 366(c) (2006).
In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 237, at *21-22.
Id. at *22-23.
492 F.3d 242, 245 (4th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 245-46.
Id. at 245.
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pany ("Zurich") in accordance with the provision of its liability insurance policy that required Rea to report any occurrence which
may result in a claim. 92 The insurance company undertook extensive investigation of the accident, expecting to be sued by Dunnagan and other victims involved in the accident.393 The accident was
widely covered in the local media, and
[olne newspaper article, in particular, contained a photograph of
Dunnagan and reported the details of the Dunnagan Accident, as
well [sic] Dunnagan's death on January 22, 2003. [The Rea project
manager] cut this article out of the newspaper and kept it in his office in a location where it could readily be observed as a continuing
reminder of the importance of safety in Rea's work.394

About a year after the accident, J.A. Jones, Inc., and various
subsidiaries, including Rea, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 95 The
bankruptcy court set the bar date for creditors to file prepetition
claims against the estate at February 2, 2004.396 Notice of the filing
of the bankruptcy case and the claims bar date was served on "certain known creditors" of the debtors, but Dunnagan's estate did not
receive such notice.3 97 Notice was also published in The Wall Street
Journal and The Charlotte Observer.39s Later, in the summer of
2004, the debtors served notice of the August 18, 2004, confirmation hearing on the debtors' Chapter 11 plan to certain known
creditors and published the notice in the same newspapers, but
again Dunnagan's estate did not receive such notice or see the published notices.3 99 The estate did not know about the bankruptcy

392. Id. at 246.
393. Id. The court exhaustively listed the measures undertaken by Rea and Zurich in the
accident investigation:

Among the documents Rea assembled were accident reports prepared by the
State Highway Patrol disclosing Dunnagan's name, address and date of birth;
newspaper articles regarding the 1-77 accidents; press releases regarding the
1-77 construction project; photographs; roadway diagrams; project diaries;
project supervisor diaries; and other documents concerning Rea's potential
liability for the 1-77 construction zone accidents, including specifically the
Dunnagan Accident. Cheek [,the Rea project manager,] also prepared a timeline of critical events pertaining to the 1-77 accidents. A copy of this timeline,
together with approximately 250 pages of assembled relevant documents,
was sent by Cheek to the Rea Claims Department, as well as to Zurich.

Id.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

Id. at 246-47.
Id. at 247.
Id.
Id. at 247-48.
Id. at 248.
Id.
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case until late October 2004, long after the bar date had passed,
and over a month after the bankruptcy court had approved the
debtors' Chapter 11 plan."0
On December 9, 2004, the administrator of Dunnagan's estate
filed a motion in the bankruptcy court for an extension of time to
file a claim against the bankruptcy estate and a determination
that Dunnagan's estate was not bound by the confirmed plan because it was a known creditor that did not receive actual notice of
the debtors' bankruptcy case and the applicable deadlines. 40 1 Zurich
opposed the administrator's motion, and the court held several
hearings on the claims bar date issue and ancillary issues such as
granting relief from the automatic stay so that the estate could sue
Rea in state court before the statute of limitations period ran out
under state law. 40 2 Almost a year after the administrator filed the
motion for an extension, the bankruptcy court granted the motion
by final order on December 20, 2005, and allowed the late filing of
a prepetition claim against the bankruptcy estate.0 3 The bankruptcy court also found that Dunnagan's estate was not bound by the
liquidation plan because it was a known creditor of Rea and did not
receive actual notice of the filing of the bankruptcy case, the claims
bar date, the confirmation hearing date, or the deadline for filing
objections to the debtors' Chapter 11 plan. 404 Zurich appealed the
final order of the bankruptcy court to the district court, which affirmed the judgment of the bankruptcy court on June 20, 2006.405
Zurich then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir406
cuit.
The Fourth Circuit stated that the appeal turned on whether
Dunnagan's estate was a known or unknown creditor:
In this regard, to achieve a constitutionally permissible discharge of
a known creditor's claim against a debtor, actual notice of the bankruptcy filing and applicable bar date is required. By contrast, where
a creditor is unknown to the debtor, constructive notice-typically in

400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 249.
Id.
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the form of publication-is generally sufficient to pass constitutional
muster." 7

In this case, because of the personal knowledge of Rea's employees,
the coverage of the accident in the local media, the reporting of the
accident to Rea's insurer, and the investigation of the accident
which was conducted by Rea and Zurich jointly, the Fourth Circuit
held that Dunnagan's estate was a known creditor of the debtor
and was therefore entitled to actual notice. 40 8 To explain the rule,
the court wrote:
What is reasonable depends on the particular facts of each case. A
debtor need not be omnipotent or clairvoyant. A debtor is obligated,
however, to undertake more than a cursory review of its records and
files to ascertain its known creditors. Thus, stated succinctly, a
known creditor or claim arises from facts that would alert a reasonable debtor, based on a careful examination of its own books and
records, to the possibility that a claim might reasonably be filed
40 9
against it by a particular individual or entity.

In In re Rowe Furniture,Inc., a creditor filed proofs of claim in
the Chapter 11 case of the debtor's parent company, but not in the
debtor's case, because the creditor mistakenly believed the parent
was liable for the debt rather than the debtor. 410 The creditor also
filed an objection to the sale of the debtor's assets in the debtor's
case while the debtor was still in Chapter 11, but before the conversion to Chapter 7, asserting that it was the holder of claims
against the debtor.411 After the bar date for filing claims in the debtor's case passed, the creditor realized its mistake-it had filed its
proofs of claims in the parent company's case and not the debtor's. 4 12 The creditor asked the court to allow the claims in the debtor's Chapter 7 case as amendments to the claims that had been
timely filed in the parent's case. 413 The court held that those proofs
of claims filed in the parent company's case could not be informal
proofs of claim in the debtor's Chapter 7 case, but the creditor's ob-

407. Id. at 249-50 (footnotes omitted).
408. Id. at 251-52.
409. Id. at 251 (quoting In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 151 B.R. 674, 681
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993)) (citation omitted); see also Bosiger v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 510 F.3d

442, 451-52 (4th Cir. 2007); In re U.S. Airways, Inc., No. 04-13819-SSM, 2008 WL 850659,
at *5-6 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Mar. 27, 2008).
410. 384 B.R. 732,734-35 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2008).
411.
412.
413.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 735.
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jection to the sale of the debtor's assets could be treated as an
amendable proof of claim.414 The court relied on the Fourth Cir415
cuit's liberal allowance of informal claims.

1. Administrative Expenses
The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held
in In re Circuit City Stores, Inc. that the debtor, Circuit City, did
not have to immediately pay "stub rent" for the month in which it
filed for bankruptcy. 4 6 "Stub rent" is the portion of rent due for the
post-petition period of occupancy from the date of the petition
through the end of the month.417 For example, Circuit City filed its
case on November 10, 2008, and the "stub rent" was the rent due
for occupancy during November 10-November 30.418 At the time

Circuit City filed its bankruptcy petition it had not paid any rent to
the lessors at issue. 41 9 A complicating fact was that there were two
types of leases-arrears leases and advance leases. 4 20 Arrears leas-

es are those lease agreements where the rent for November is due
421
on November 30th; i.e., the rent for the month is paid in arrears. '
Advance leases are those lease agreements where the rent for November is due on November 1st; i.e., the rent for the month is paid
in advance.422 In bankruptcy, the date the petition is filed generally
23
cuts off prepetition debts from post-petition debts.4

The lessors filed motions to compel Circuit City to immediately
pay the stub rent, arguing that § 365(d)(3) requires the debtor to
do SO. 424 Section 365(d)(3) provides in relevant part that
[tihe trustee shall timely perform all the obligations of the debtor
[except certain obligations not applicable in this case] arising from
and after the order for relief under any unexpired lease of nonresidential real property, until such lease is assumed or rejected, not-

414. Id. at 738.
415. Id.; see Davis v. Columbia Constr. Co. (In re Davis), 936 F.2d 771, 775-76 (4th Cir.
1991); Fyne v. Atlas Supply Co., 245 F.2d 107, 109 (4th Cir. 1957).
416. No. 08-35653, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 672, at *24-25 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Feb. 12, 2009).
417. See id. at *4.
418. Id.
419. Id. at *3.
420. Id.
421. See id.
422. See id.
423. See id. at *11.
424. Id. at *3-4; see 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(3) (2006).
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withstanding section 503(b)(1) of this title. The court may extend, for
cause, the time for performance of any such obligation that arises
within 60 days after the date of the order for relief, but the time
for
4 25
performance shall not be extended beyond such 60-day period.

So the question in this case was whether the obligation to pay rent
under these leases arose "from and after" the order for relief (the
petition date in this case. 42 6 The court described two different methods for answering that question-the "accrual method" and the
"billing method."42 7 The accrual method means that the obligation
arises day by day, and so the filing of the petition cuts off prepetition rent from post-petition rent.42 The billing method means that
the obligation arises when the payment is due under the terms of
the lease, so using this method would lead to different results depending on whether the lease is advance or arrears.4 29 Under the
billing method, an advance lease in this case would result in the
rent for November being a prepetition claim, no matter that the
debtor would have occupied the premises post-petition and thereby
gained a post-petition benefit. 3 ° Conversely, an arrears lease would
result in the rent for November being an entirely post-petition
claim, elevating such a lessor's position over similarly situated lessors who happen to hold advance leases. 43, The court followed the
decision in In re Trak Auto Corp. and held that the accrual method
32
applies in the Fourth Circuit.4
The next question was when stub rent must be paid, since stub
rent is paid as an administrative expense because the obligation
arises post-petition. 433 Section 365(d)(3) uses the term "timely," but
does not define when "timely" payment occurs. 434 The court held
that "timely" means whatever the lease term says it means-an
arrears lease says timely performance is at the end of the month,

425. In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 672, at *7 (quoting 11 U.S.C. §
365(d)(3) (2006)).
426. Id. at *9.
427. Id. at *10; see In re Trak Auto Corp., 277 B.R. 655, 662 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2002),
rev'd on other grounds, 367 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting that a minority of courts have
adopted the "billing method" while the majority of courts have adopted the "accrual me-

thod").
428. See In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 672, at *11.
429. Id. at *10-12.

430. Id.
431. Id. at *11-12.
432. Id. at *12 (citingIn re Trak Auto Corp., 277 B.R.at 663 n.2).

433. Id. at *17.
434. Id. at *17-18; see 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(3) (2006).
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and advance leases say timely performance is at the beginning of
the month.43 5 Because the time for timely performance on advance
leases expired prepetition, the stub rent on those leases should be
paid as an administrative expense along with all other administrative expenses-upon plan confirmation. 4 6 Because the time for
timely performance on arrears leases had not yet expired, the time
for performance was at the end of the month, and § 365(d)(3) com437
pels the debtor to pay such stub rent at the end of the month.
However, the remedy for the debtor not complying with this requirement is not immediate payment of the stub rent. 438 For example, the court held that the debtor must pay stub rent at the end of
the month for its arrears leases. 439 If the debtor does not do so, the
court may not order immediate payment because to do so would
elevate the claim for stub rent to superpriority status, which is not
allowed under the Code. 440 The only remedy is that stub rent shall
in any event be paid upon plan confirmation if the debtor does not
pay it before then.4 1
2. Voting Rights
Simon, of In re Simon, was the owner of a medical practice and
filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case, but then converted it to Chapter 11.442 Three former patients filed unliquidated medical malpractice tort claims that exceeded $13 million.4 4 3 Simon objected to the
three claims, arguing that they should all be classified separately
from the liquidated, undisputed, nonpriority unsecured claims filed
in his case.4 44 These other unsecured claims totaled approximately
$627,000. 4 . Simon also wanted to estimate the amount of the med-

435. In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 672, at *22.
436. Id. at *22-23.
437. Id. at *22; see 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(3).
438. Id. at *24-25.
439. Id. at *25.
440. Id. at *24; see also In re Va. Packaging Supply Co., 122 B.R. 491, 494-95 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1990).
441. Id. at *25.
442. No. 07-31414-KRH, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2787, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Va. July 29, 2008).
443. Id. at *3.
444. Id. at *4.
445. Id. at *2-3.
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ical malpractice tort claims for voting purposes. 446 The former patients objected to Simon's proposed treatment of their claims." 7
The court agreed with Simon that the medical malpractice
claims should be separately classified and estimated at $1.00 each
for voting purposes. 448 The Code provides that a Chapter 11 plan
cannot be confirmed unless at least one-half of the creditors,
representing two-thirds of the amount of allowed claims in a particular class, vote in favor of the plan." 9 The former patients argued that Simon's proposal improperly reclassified their claims in
an attempt to limit the impact of their vote. 450 They stated that
their claims were substantially similar to all the other general,
nonpriority unsecured claims. 4 5' Section 1122(a) allows for substantially similar claims to be placed in different classes only if the
debtor (or plan proponent, if different from the debtor) can articulate legitimate differences between the two proposed classes and
the separate classification is in the best interests of creditors in
42
general. 1
The court did not agree with the former patients for several reasons. First, it would not be expedient to administer Simon's case
with the tort claims outstanding.4 53 Liquidation of personal injury
tort claims is not a "core" matter appropriately decided by a bankruptcy court, and so the district court would have jurisdiction over
the medical malpractice lawsuits. 4-1 Determining the exact amount
of damages for each of the medical malpractice tort claims could
take years in the district court. 455 If the tort claims were not separately classified and estimated for voting purposes, Simon would
have to wait years for the district court judgments before he could
propose a confirmable plan. Second, the court held that the medical
malpractice claims were unliquidated and disputed-very different
from the unsecured claims that were liquidated and undis-

446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.

Id. at *4.
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at *22.
Id. at *6 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2006)).
Id. at *11.
Id. at *10.
11 U.S.C. § 1122(a).
In re Simon, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2787, at *16-17.
Id. at *17.
Id.
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puted.45 6 Separate classification of the malpractice claims made
sense given their fundamentally different nature. Finally, only "allowed" claims give rise to the right to vote on a plan. Section 502(a)
of the Code says that an allowed claim is one to which no objection
has been made. 457 Here, Simon objected to the claims.458 Rule
3018(a) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure provides for
the temporary allowance of claims just for voting purposes, and §
502(c) allows the court to estimate claims that are temporarily allowed for voting purposes. 459 The court noted that $1.00 is recognized as a reasonable estimation of tort claims, so the former patients could determine their relative voting power-each of the
three tort claimants would have equal weight within their new
separate class.460
G. Professionalsand Petition Preparers
1. In re Rennie Petroleum Corp.
In In re Rennie Petroleum Corp., the bankruptcy court denied retroactive employment under § 327 of a business analyst for the
debtor, and also denied the alternative request for compensation
for the business analyst under § 503(b)(4) for having made a "substantial contribution" to the debtor's case. 461 Without filing an application to employ the analyst as a professional for the debtor, the
analyst nonetheless began providing services to the debtor shortly
after the case was filed.4 62 During the course of the analyst's work
for the debtor, the debtor alternately considered retaining him as a
consultant, a CFO, or as an investment banker.4 63 The debtor had
already filed applications to employ its counsel, as well as an accountant and financial advisor.464 A few months after the case was
filed, the debtor filed an application to employ a different entity as
investment banker to assist in the marketing and sale of the entire

456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.

Id. at *17-18.
11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2006).
In re Simon, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2787, at *14.
11 U.S.C. § 502(c); FED. R. BANKR. P. 3018(a).
In re Simon, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2787, at *21-22.
384 B.R. 412, 414, 417-18 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2008); see 11 U.S.C. §§ 327, 503(b)(4).
In re Rennie Petroleum Corp., 384 B.R. at 414.
Id. at 414-15.
Id. at 414.
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business. 465 Only after the analyst was not selected for the position

of investment banker did the debtor file its application to employ
the analyst as a professional person under § 327 retroactive to the
time when he began providing services to the debtor. 4 6 Alternative-

ly, the debtor argued that the analyst should be compensated under § 503(b)(4) because he had provided a "substantial contribution" to the debtor's bankruptcy case. 467 The Official Committee of

Unsecured Creditors objected to the retroactive employment and to
468
the request for compensation under § 503(b)(4).

The bankruptcy court explained that "[a] professional person
may be compensated from the bankruptcy estate in a Chapter 11
case only if that professional's employment was properly authorized by the court pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 327 or 1103. '' 469 A pro-

fessional person who performs services without first getting his
employment approved by the court "will be treated as a volunteer
notwithstanding that the services rendered may have been beneficial to the bankruptcy estate."470 The reason behind this rule is that

"[r]equiring prior court authorization of employment affords the
Court as well as the parties in the case the opportunity to assess
the wisdom or propriety of using estate assets in the manner proposed. It is a means by which the Court can control administrative
expenses. '' 471 There is an exception to this hard-and-fast rule for ex-

traordinary circumstances, and the movant bears the burden of
proof on two elements: "(1) the professional [must] satisfactorily
explain the failure to obtain prior approval of employment and (2)
the professional [must] meet the requirements set forth in § 327
and Rule 2014(a), aside from that of obtaining timely court appointment."4 72 In this case, the debtor was unable to explain the
failure to obtain prior court approval. 4 73 The court explained:
The Debtor initially planned to hire [the analyst] as a salaried officer. Later the Debtor considered employing [the analyst] to oversee

465,

Id. at 415.

466. Id.
467. Id. at 414; see 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(4) (2006).
468. In re Rennie Petroleum Corp., 384 B.R. at 414.
469. Id. at 415 (citing In re Hagan, 145 B.R. 515, 518 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992); see 11
U.S.C. §§ 327, 1103 (2006).
470. In re Rennie Petroleum Corp., 384 B.R. at 415 (citing In re Fountain Bay Mining
Co., 46 B.R. 122, 124 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1985)).
471. Id. at 416.
472. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 327; FED. R. BANKR. P. 2014(a).

473. In re Rennie Petroleum Corp., 384 B.R. at 416.
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the sale of its business pursuant to § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Both of these situations would have required the prior approval of
the Court. The competing roles in which it had been contemplated
that [the analyst] might serve the estate were mutually exclusive. It
appears that the parties elected to delay the submission of the initial
employment application so as not to preclude [the analyst] from consideration for engagement as the Debtor's investment banker. While
the Court is sympathetic to [the analyst]'s situation ... the Code requires, and proper functioning of bankruptcy cases demands, that
the procedures in the Code and the Bankruptcy Rules be followed as
they relate to the employment and compensation of professionals.
The process is designed so as to permit parties in interest to understand (as a result of the notice and disclosure required by those procedures) the extent to which the estate may be depleted by the employment of the proposed professional.474

The court sustained the committee's objection to the retroactive
employment.47- Turning next to the debtor's "substantial contribution" argument under § 503(b)(4), the court rejected that argument
because § 503(b)(4) is applicable only to an entity whose expenses
are allowable under § 503(b)(3). 476 The analyst in this case provided
services to the debtor, not to one of the six categories of entities
under § 503(b)(3), and therefore, § 503(b)(4) was inapplicable to the
analyst's request for compensation under that Code section-"no
matter how substantial his contribution may have been to this
case."477

2. McDow v. Mayton
Under the Code, a "bankruptcy petition preparer" is a "person,
other than an attorney for the debtor or an employee of such attorney under the direct supervision of such attorney, who prepares for
compensation a document for filing," which includes "a petition or
any other document prepared for filing by a debtor in a United
States bankruptcy court."478 Because these persons are not attorneys bound by professional standards, the Code places several restrictions and penalties upon bankruptcy petition preparers for

474.

Id. at 416-17; see 11 U.S.C. § 363.

475. In re Rennie Petroleum Corp., 384 B.R. at 417-18.
476. Id. at 417; see 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3), (4).
477. In re Rennie Petroleum Corp., 384 B.R. at 417.
478. 11 U.S.C. § 110(a).
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negligent or fraudulent preparation of documents and for the unauthorized practice of law."'
In McDow v. Mayton, the United States Trustee filed a complaint against such a person, who was not a licensed attorney but
had prepared several documents for a debtor in a North Carolina
bankruptcy case, and obtained a default judgment when the defendant petition preparer failed to respond to the complaint. 4s0 The
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found that the
defendant violated numerous subsections of § 110 because he provided legal advice to the Chapter 11 debtor, did not disclose his social security number, and implied that he was a licensed attorney.481 The court permanently enjoined him from acting as a
bankruptcy petition preparer in any bankruptcy court or district
court of the United States, from using a computer, Internet website, or other electronic means to violate § 110, and from the unau82
thorized practice of law.4
H. Taxation: Florida Department of Revenue v. Piccadilly
Cafeterias, Inc.
In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled
3
that the stamp-tax exemption contained in 11 U.S.C. § 1146(a)4
applies only to post-confirmation transfers made under the authority of a confirmed plan-not to transfers made after the Chapter 11

479. See 11 U.S.C. § 110(b).
480. 379 B.R. 601, 602-03 (E.D. Va. 2007).
481. Id. at 604-05; see 11 U.S.C. § 110. The court elaborated that this person
distributed bankruptcy advice under the name "John Hall" via an internet
website known as "www.allexperts.com." On this website, [the defendant] advertised that he has the following "Expertise": "Law school graduate (J.D.)
Degree; Over 25 years of experience throughout the United States in bankruptcy law matters (Chapters 7, 11, and 13 of the United States Bankruptcy
Code) primarily representing individual debtors with consumer debt or small
businesses; Experience has included all aspects of debtor/creditor relations."
[The defendant] offered "FREE BANKRUPTCY HELP." He stated, "I will not
charge you just to talk on the phone" and listed his phone number and personal email address at which potential clients could contact him.
McDow v. Mayton, 379 B.R. at 604.
482. Id. at 608.
483. Section 1146(a) provides that "[the issuance, transfer, or exchange of a security,
or the making or delivery of an instrument of transfer under a plan confirmed under section 1129 of this title, may not be taxed under any law imposing a stamp tax or similar
tax." 11 U.S.C. § 1146(a).
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case is filed but before the plan is confirmed. The importance of
the opinion is not necessarily just the result-especially in the
Fourth Circuit because the Court adopted the prior rule in the
Fourth Circuit-but also the method the Court used to interpret
the Bankruptcy Code.
In general, stamp taxes
share the following common elements: (1) they are imposed only at
the time of transfer or sale of the item at issue; (2) the amount due is
determined by the consideration for, par value of, or value of the
item being transferred; (3) the tax rate is a relatively small percentage of the consideration, par value or value of the property; (4) the
tax is imposed irrespective of whether the transferor enjoyed a gain
or suffered a loss on the underlying sale or transfer; and (5) in the
case of state documentary transfer taxes, the tax must be paid as a
prerequisite to recording.485

Before the Piccadilly case, the federal circuit courts of appeals
were split on the question of whether the plan already had to be
confirmed at the time of the transfer for the exemption from stamp
taxes to apply.488 The Third and Fourth Circuits ruled that the
"under a plan confirmed" language in Section 1146(a) is read to
mean under a plan that has been confirmed. 7 After the Eleventh
Circuit ruled in Piccadilly that preconfirmation transfers are exempt from stamp taxes, the Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari to resolve the question. 8 The Court first noted
that "Florida and Piccadilly base[d] their competing readings of §
1146(a) on the provision's text, on inferences drawn from other
Code provisions, and on substantive canons of statutory construc9
tion. We consider each of their arguments in turn."48
The provision's text. When the Court analyzed the text of §
1146(a), it discussed the parties' arguments about whether the
word "under" renders the statute facially ambiguous. 490 Florida as-

484. Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. -, 128 S. Ct. 2326,
2330 (2008).
485. 995 Fifth Ave. Assocs., L.P. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin. (In re 995 Fifth
Ave. Assocs., L.P.), 963 F.2d 503, 512 (2d Cir. 1992).
486. See Lorenzo Marinuzzi & Jordan A. Wishnew, Piccadilly Cafeterias: Congress
Should Revisit Supreme Court's Bright-Line Test, 27-6 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 55 (2008).
487. See In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., 335 F.3d 243, 246 (3d Cir. 2003); In re NVR,
LP, 189 F.3d 442, 458 (4th Cir. 1999).
488. Piccadilly, 128 S. Ct. at 2331.
489. Id.
490. Id. at 2332-33.
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serted that "under" means "subject to" and that "plan confirmed"
means "confirmed plan"; thus, the stamp tax exemption would apply only to transfers that are "subject to a plan that has been confirmed subject to § 1129," and transfers made preconfirmation
"cannot be subject to, or under the authority of, something that did
not exist at the time of the transfer."491 Piccadilly asserted that the
language is ambiguous and could be read to mean "in agreement
with a plan confirmed" so long as the transfers had "some nexus"
with a plan that is eventually confirmed. 492 But the Court held:
Although we agree with Florida that the more natural reading of
§ 1146(a) is that the exemption applies only to postconfirmation
transfers, ultimately we need not decide whether the statute is unambiguous on its face. Even assuming, arguendo, that the language
of § 1146(a) is facially ambiguous, the ambiguity must be resolved in
493
Florida's favor.

Even though the Court did not decide whether the language of §
1146(a) is or is not ambiguous, it nonetheless concluded:
While both sides present credible interpretations of § 1146(a),
Florida has the better one. To be sure, Congress could have used
more precise language-i.e., "under a plan that has been confirmed-and thus removed all ambiguity. But the two readings of
the language that Congress chose are not equally plausible: Of the
494
two, Florida's is clearly the more natural.

Inferences drawn from other Code provisions. The Court discussed the parties' competing arguments about other Code provisions that do unambiguously place a temporal limitation on their
provisions. 495 Piccadilly argued that, for example, § 1127 states that
the proponent of a plan may modify it "at any time before confirmation"; § 1104(a) states "[alt any time after the commencement of
the case but before confirmation of a plan.. ."; § 1104(c) states "[a] t
any time before the confirmation of a plan.

."... '496

Therefore, Pic-

cadilly argued that Congress clearly did not intend for § 1146(a) to
include a temporal limitation because it did not clearly include
one. 497 Furthermore, Piccadilly "buttresse[d] its conclusion by

491. Id. at 2332; see 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2006).
492. Piccadilly, 128 S. Ct. at 2332-33.

493. Id. at 2333.
494. Id. at 2332.

495. Id. at 2333.
496. Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a), (c), 1127.
497. Piccadilly, 128 S. Ct. at 2333.
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pointing out that § 1146(b)-the subsection immediately following
§ 1146(a)-includes an express temporal limitation. ' 491 Piccadilly
pointed to still other Code sections to illustrate the folly of reading
the word "under" in § 1146(a) to mean "subject to" or "authorized
by. 4 99 On the other hand, Florida argued that "the subchapter in
which § 1146(a) appears is entitled 'POSTCONFIRMATION
MATTERS,"' and that, "while not dispositive, the placement of a
provision in a particular subchapter suggests that its terms should
be interpreted consistent with that subchapter."0 0 Florida argued
that "it would have been superfluous for Congress to add any further limitations to § 1146(a)'s already unambiguous temporal element."5o1
The Court was again persuaded by Florida's argument. The
Court concluded that "[ilt was unnecessary for Congress to include
in § 1146(a) a phrase such as 'at any time after confirmation of
such plan' because the phrase 'under a plan confirmed' is most naturally read to require that there be a confirmed plan at the time of
the transfer."502 Rejecting Piccadilly's "curious interpretation" of §
1146, the Court reasoned that
[t]o read the statute as Piccadilly proposes would make § 1146(a)'s
exemption turn on whether a debtor-in-possession's actions are consistent with a legal instrument that does not exist-and indeed may
not even be conceived of-at the time of the sale. Reading § 1146(a)
in context with other relevant Code provisions, we find nothing justifying such a curious interpretation of what is a straightforward ex50 3
emption.

More curious is the Court's failure to discuss in this context
what it acknowledged earlier in the opinion-"On January 26,
2004, as a precondition to the sale, Piccadilly entered into a global
settlement agreement with committees of senior secured noteholders and unsecured creditors. The settlement agreement dictated
the priority of distribution of the sale proceeds among Piccadilly's
creditors.... The sale closed on March 16, 2004."504 At the time the

498. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1146(b) (2006)).
499. Piccadilly, 128 S. Ct. at 2334 (discussing 11 U.S.C. §§ 303(a), 365(g)(1),
1123(b)(2)).
500. Id. at 2334-35.
501. Id. at 2335.
502. Id.
503. Id.
504. Id. at 2330.
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sale closed, the plan had not been submitted to the bankruptcy
court. 0 - But the Court did not mention the global settlement
agreement-which in this case served many of the same functions
of a plan, such as dictating the priority of distribution of sale
proceeds-when it said that the plan was a legal instrument that
did not exist and may not even have been conceived of. How could
Congress have intended the words "under a plan confirmed" to refer to a legal instrument that may not exist? As Justice Breyer
noted in the dissent, "[tihe absence of a clear answer in text or canons, however, should not lead us to judicial despair. Consistent
with Court precedent, we can and should ask a further question:
Why would Congress have insisted upon temporal limits? What
50 6
reasonable purpose might such limits serve?"
The Court determined that "one major reason why a transfer
may take place before rather than after a plan is confirmed is that
the preconfirmation bankruptcy process takes time."507 If the statutory objectives set forth in the Bankruptcy Code are to preserve the
value of the business as a going concern and to maximize creditors'
recovery by providing tax relief to debtors for the facilitation of
bankruptcy asset sales, then how, Justice Breyer asks, "would the
majority's temporal limitation further these statutory objectives? It
would not do so in any way," and "[i]n fact, the majority's reading
of temporal limits in § 1146(a) serves no reasonablecongressional
purpose at all."5°8 Justice Breyer argues that the statutory objectives are clear-"turn[ over to the estate (for the use of creditors
or to facilitate reorganization) funds that otherwise would go to
pay state stamp taxes on plan-related transferred assets"--and
that the temporal limitation actually undermines those objectives. 59 Justice Breyer explains the congressional purpose behind
the "under a plan confirmed" language as "provid[ing] the bankruptcy judge's assurance that the transfer meets with creditor ap51
proval and the requirements laid out in § 1129." 0
Justice Breyer concluded: "[I]nsofar as the Court's interpretation
of the statute reduces the funds made available, that interpreta-

505.
506.
507.
508.
509.
510.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 2341 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
at 2342 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
at 2341-42.
at 2342; see 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2006).
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tion inhibits the statute's efforts to achieve its basic objectives,"
and even "[w]orse than that, if the potential loss of stamp tax revenue threatens delay in implementing any such decision to sell,
then creditors (or the remaining reorganized enterprise) could suffer far more serious harm. They could lose the extra revenues that
a speedy sale might otherwise produce." 511
Substantive canons of statutory construction. Before the Court
turned to the third part of its analysis-substantive canons of statutory construction-it summed up the first two parts:
[Elven if we were fully to accept Piccadilly's textual and contextual
arguments, they would establish at most that the statutory language
is ambiguous. They do not-and largely are not intended todemonstrate that § 1146(a)'s purported ambiguity should be resolved
in Piccadilly's favor. Florida argues that various nontextual canons
of construction require us to resolve any ambiguity in its favor. Piccadilly responds with substantive canons of its own. It is to these dueling canons of construction that we now turn. 512

Florida's argument began with the Lorillard canon-that
"'Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation
when it re-enacts a statute without change."' 513The "under a plan
confirmed" language
has remained unchanged since 1978 despite several revisions of the
Bankruptcy Code. The most recent revision in 2005 occurred after
the Fourth Circuit's decision in NVR and the Third Circuit's decision
in Hechinger but before the Eleventh Circuit's decision below. Florida asserts that Congress ratified this longstanding interpretation
when, in its most recent amendments to the Code, it "readopted" the
stamp-tax provision verbatim as § 1146(a). 514

Next, Florida invoked the Sierra Summit canon-"that courts
should 'proceed carefully when asked to recognize an exemption
from state taxation that Congress has not clearly expressed."' 515
Florida used the Sierra Summit canon to argue that the stamp
tax exemption in § 1146(a) should not apply to preconfirmation
transfers because Congress did not clearly express such an ex-

511.
512.
513.
514.
515.
2003)).

Piccadilly, 128 S.Ct. at 2342.
Id. at 2336.
Id. (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978)).
Piccadilly, 128 S. Ct. at 2336.
Id. at 2336-37 (quoting In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., 335 F.3d 243, 254 (3d Cir.
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emption and because to do so would interfere with the adminis-

tration of its taxation scheme. 516
Piccadilly countered Florida's argument regarding the Sierra
Summit canon by asserting that the exemption is clearly expressed
in § 1146(a).5 17 Also, Piccadilly pointed out that taxes like Florida's
stamp tax are post-petition claims, which are paid (absent an exemption) as an administrative expense with priority over the prepetition claims of other creditors.1 Such administrative expenses
are analogous to preferences, and provisions of the Code allowing
preferences "should not be construed to diminish other claimants'
recoveries."' 9 Piccadilly argued that the clearly expressed purpose
of § 1146(a) is tax relief, and any ambiguity in its text must be construed in its favor to avoid frustrating Congress's goal of maximiz°
ing the distribution to creditors.52
The Court chose to follow the Sierra Summit canon rather than
the Howard Delivery Service canon because it was not persuaded
that allowing the stamp tax on prepetition transfers is tantamount
to a preference. 521 The Court explained that
Piccadilly's effort to evade the canon falls well short of the mark because reading § 1146(a) in the manner Piccadilly proposes would require us to do exactly what the [Sierra Summit] canon counsels
against. If we recognized an exemption for preconfirmation transfers, we would in effect be "recogniz[ing] an exemption from state
taxation that Congress has not clearly expressed"-namely, an exemption for preconfirmation transfers. 22

To reach this conclusion, the Court assumed that "clearly" equals
"unambiguous." The Court did not ask whether Congress could
have clearly expressed the exemption in ambiguous language.
In sum, the Court wrote:
The most natural reading of § 1146(a)'s text, the provision's
placement within the Code, and applicable substantive canons all
lead to the same conclusion: Section 1146(a) affords a stamp-tax ex-

516. Id. at 2337.
517. Id.
518. Id.
519. Id. (citing Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 651, 667
(2006)).
520. Id. at 2338.
521. Id.
522. Id. at 2338 (quoting Cal. State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc., 490 U.S.
844, at 851-52 (1989)).
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emption only to transfers made pursuant to a Chapter 11 plan that
has been confirmed. Because Piccadilly transferred its assets before
its Chapter 11 plan was confirmed by the Bankruptcy
Court, it may
52 3
not rely on § 1146(a) to avoid Florida's stamp taxes.
IV. CONCLUSION

As convoluted as BAPCPA sometimes turned out to be, one can
see in it a clear reflection of the historic tug-of-war between creditors' rights and mercy for honest, but unfortunate, debtors. A recent magazine article called the United States "the most bankrupt
nation on Earth.... We are the Michael Phelps of debt liquidation."524 While commentators continue to hammer out a consensus
on BAPCPA's specific effect, 525 most people understand the common
sense notion that
[i]f you're the kind of person who buys now and worries later, the
idea that government is making your inevitable bankruptcy filing
slightly more annoying won't discourage you. Actually, a higher hurdle to bankruptcy will make things worse, because banks will offer to
lend you more money if getting the debt discharged is harder for
you-money that you will happily, and irresponsibly, borrow and
spend. The people who are most likely to be deterred from borrowing
are the people who are taking the rationally contemplated risk of
526
starting a company or buying their first home.

While bankruptcy courts must myopically examine BAPCPA for
its plain meaning, the Supreme Court of the United States has recently reminded the profession of the need to back away from the
details and "keep purposes of bankruptcy law in the foreground" as
practitioners and jurists continue to interpret the new Code and
discover "multiple, conflicting plain meanings for the same lan527
guage, when meaning is obviously debatable."

523. Id. at 2339.
524. Megan McArdle, Sink and Swim: Bankruptcy Helps the Undeserving-And That's
the Way It Should Be, THE ATLANTIC, June 2009, at 30.
525. See, e.g., Rafael I. Pardo, Failing to Answer Whether Bankruptcy Reform Failed: A
Critique of the FirstReport from the 2007 ConsumerBankruptcy Project, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J.
27 (2009); cf Robert M. Lawless et al., InterpretingData:A Reply to ProfessorPardo, 83 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 47 (2009).

526.
527.

McArdle, supra note 524, at 32.

Jean Braucher, A Guide to Interpretation of the 2005 Bankruptcy Law, 16 AM.
BANKR. INST. 349, 350, & n.10 (2008) (discussing Marrama and Piccadilly Cafeterias); see
also Thomas F. Waldron & Neil M. Berman, PrincipledPrinciplesof Statutory Interpretation:
A Judicial Perspective After Two Years of BAPCPA, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 195, 213 (2007)
("[Clourts should no longer feel compelled to engage in the fiction of finding plain meaning.").

